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Executive	summary	
According	 to	 both	 the	 Dutch	 and	 Russian	 governments,	 the	 relations	 between	 the	 two	
countries	 have	 deteriorated	 since	 2014	 (Dutch	MFA	 2015d,	 12;	 Shulgin	 2016).	 This	 study	
examines	how	the	relations	have	developed	over	the	period	2013-2015,	as	reflected	in	both	
the	 phraseology	 used	 and	 topics	 discussed	 in	 the	 published	 communiqués.	 The	 main	
research	 question	 of	 the	 thesis	 is:	 how	did	 the	 different	 issues	 of	 Russian-Dutch	 relations	
develop	 in	 the	 communiqués	published	by	both	governments	over	 the	period	2013-2015?	
The	 four	 sub-questions	 to	 answer	 this	 are:	 what	 are	 the	 most	 discussed	 key	 issues	 of	
Russian-Dutch	relations?	How	can	these	issues	be	analysed?	What	was	the	general	trend	in	
Russian-Dutch	 relations?	How	do	 the	most	 discussed	 topics	 relate	 to	 the	 general	 trend	 in	
relations?		
The	 existing	 literature	 on	 Russian-Dutch	 relations	 looked	 at	 the	 topics	 of	 trade,	
energy,	 human	 rights	 and	 the	 policy	 on	 common	 (EU-Russia)	 neighbours	 (Leonard	 and	
Popescu	 2007;	 Casier	 2011;	 Gerrits	 2013).	 They	 chose	 and	 examined	 these	 topics	 using	
personal	 experience,	 interviews	with	 officials,	 other	 academic	 literature	 and	 sometimes	 a	
government	document.	Contrary	to	the	literature,	this	study	selected	the	subjects	that	were	
discussed	most	frequently	by	the	two	governments.	It	examines	all	the	communiqués	from	
the	Russian	and	the	Dutch	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	their	head	of	state	or	government,	
as	they	are	the	representatives	of	the	countries	abroad.	The	topics	that	were	raised	in	15%	
or	more	of	one	year’s	communiqués	are	the	key	topics	and	chapters	in	this	thesis.	These	are:	
MH17,	 the	 Ukraine	 crisis,	 Crimea’s	 incorporation,	 the	 shared	 neighbourhood,	 diplomatic	
incidents,	trade,	energy,	sanctions	and	human	rights.		
In	order	to	analyse	the	issues	and	the	general	trend,	each	communiqué	is	allocated	
an	overall	value.	Additionally,	the	study	distils	the	topics	discussed	in	each	communiqué	and	
gives	these	a	value	as	well.	The	values	range	from	‘-2’	(very	negative)	to	‘+2’	(very	positive).	
The	 value	 assesses	 how	 both	 countries	 talk	 about	 each	 other.	 It	 is	 assessed	 as	 being	
‘positive’	when	 it	contributes	 to	building	a	constructive	partnership	and	 ‘negative’	when	 it	
damages	 such	 a	 partnership.	 This	 gives	 a	 less	 subjective	 account	 of	 the	developments	 for	
each	topic	and	relations	in	general.	The	less	arbitrary	method	to	assess	the	state	of	relations,	
and	the	detailed	documentation	on	which	communiqués	this	is	assessed,	can	be	seen	as	the	
main	contribution	of	this	thesis.		
The	accumulated	values	of	all	 the	communiqués	can	be	seen	as	a	reflection	of	 the	
relations	 between	 both	 countries.	 This	 accumulated	 value	 shows	 the	 statements	 on	 each	
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other	 in	the	communiqués	became	more	negative	and	this	thus	confirms	the	deterioration	
in	 the	 relationship.	 The	 accumulated	 score	 of	 the	 communiqués	 went	 down	 to	 ‘-45’	 in	
December	 2015.	 Furthermore,	 the	 accumulated	 value	 presents	 the	 general	 trend	 in	
relations.	The	general	trend	 in	Russian-Dutch	relations	was	that	 it	started	positive	 in	2013,	
and	 became	 more	 negative	 with	 Crimea’s	 incorporation	 in	 March	 2014	 and	 even	 more	
negative	with	the	downing	of	MH17	in	July	2014.		
However,	 not	 all	 topics	 followed	 this	 trend	exactly	 and	 their	 discussion	developed	
independently	from	the	general	trend.	The	topics	that	were	addressed	more	negatively	from	
the	 moment	 of	 Crimea’s	 incorporation	 were:	 the	 Ukraine	 crisis,	 energy	 and	 after	 three	
months	also	Crimea’s	incorporation	itself.	After	the	downing	of	MH17	the	topics	‘the	shared	
neighbourhood’	 and	 ‘sanctions’	 were	 discussed	 more	 negatively.	 The	 discussion	 on	 the	
other	 subjects	 took	 a	 negative	 turn	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 2015.	 These	 were	MH17,	 human	
rights	 and	 political	 incidents.	 The	 discussion	 on	 trade,	 however,	 is	 one	 topic	 that	 did	 not	
deteriorate.		
To	 answer	 the	 main	 research	 question,	 the	 different	 issues	 of	 the	 Russian-Dutch	
relations	 developed	 separately	 from	 each	 other,	 but	 the	 general	 trend	 was	 that	 the	
statements	 on	 each	 other	 deteriorated	 after	 Crimea’s	 incorporation	 and	 the	 downing	 of	
MH17.	These	two	events	resulted	in	more	negative	communications	on	each	other,	because	
the	Netherlands	increasingly	saw	Russia	as	a	threat	to	the	EU’s	neighbourhood	and	its	own	
security,	 and	 therefore	 the	 focus	 returned	 to	 the	 primary	 national	 interest	 to	 ensure	 the	
safety	of	the	state	and	its	citizens.	
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1.	Introduction		
Russia	 in	 its	 2013	 Foreign	 Policy	 Concept	 specifically	 mentioned	 the	 Netherlands	 as	 a	
country	 it	wanted	 to	 “boost	mutually	 beneficial	 relations"	with	 (Russian	MFA	 2013d,	 par.	
60).	 However,	 in	 its	 2016	 Foreign	 Policy	 Concept	 the	 Netherlands	 had	 been	 dropped	
(Russian	MFA	2016).	Did	this	mean	relations	were	not	mutually	beneficial	anymore?	Russian	
ambassador	 to	 the	 Netherlands	 Alexander	 Shulgin,	 mentioned	 relations	 with	 the	
Netherlands	were	“going	through	uneasy	times”	(Shulgin	2016).	Not	only	Russia,	but	also	the	
Netherlands	said	relations	were	difficult	and	they	were	no	longer	‘business	as	usual’	(Dutch	
MFA	2015d,	12).	Russia	and	the	Netherlands	mention	the	Ukraine	crisis	of	2014	as	the	cause	
of	 the	 strained	 relations,	 but	 are	 not	 clear	 on	what	 this	means	 for	 the	 relations	 and	 how	
they	 changed.	 This	 study	 analyses	 what	 aspects	 of	 the	 relations	 changed,	 looking	 at	 the	
content	of	the	communiqués	issued	by	both.	It	gives	a	detailed	account	of	the	developments	
in	relations,	looking	at	separate	topics	over	the	period	2013-2015.		
This	 thesis	 looks	 at	 the	 communiqués	 of	 the	 Russian	 and	 the	 Dutch	 Ministry	 of	
Foreign	Affairs	(henceforth	called	MFA)	and	their	head	of	state	or	government,	because	they	
are	 the	 representatives	 of	 the	 countries	 abroad.	 A	 communiqué	 is	 defined	 as	 “an	 official	
announcement	or	statement”,	they	are	the	official	documents	published	by	a	government.	
They	are	a	useful	and	available	source	for	examining	the	governments’	position.	Examining	
the	 statements	 concerning	 the	key	 issues	 through	close	 reading	 shows	 the	 changes	 in	 the	
how	the	governments	assess	each	other.	Furthermore,	the	content	of	the	communiqués	can	
be	seen	as	a	reflection	of	the	state	of	relations,	and	subtle	changes	in	choice	of	words	can	
signify	 larger	changes	 in	relations.	The	central	question	to	map	 the	changes	 in	relations	 is:	
how	 did	 the	 different	 issues	 of	 Russian-Dutch	 relations	 develop	 in	 the	 communiqués	
published	by	both	governments	over	the	period	2013-2015?	
The	four	sub-questions	to	answer	this	are:		
• What	are	the	most	discussed	key	issues	of	Russian-Dutch	relations?	
• How	can	these	issues	be	analysed?	
• What	was	the	general	trend	in	Russian-Dutch	relations?	
• How	do	the	most	discussed	topics	relate	to	the	general	trend	in	the	relations?		
In	 the	 following	 chapter	 the	 existing	 literature	 on	 EU-Russia	 relations	 and	 Russian-Dutch	
relations	 is	discussed,	 in	order	to	see	how	these	developed	according	to	the	 literature	and	
what	were	the	most	key	issues	according	to	them.	The	methodology	explains	the	selection	
of	 topics	 used	 in	 this	 study.	 Additionally,	 it	 discusses	 the	method	 to	 analyse	 the	 selected	
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issues.	 Next	 a	 chapter	 describes	 the	 overall	 trend	 in	 the	 communiqués,	 to	 later	 draw	
connections	between	the	developments	of	the	separate	topics	and	the	overall	general	trend	
of	 the	 relations.	 Then	 the	 study	 is	 divided	 into	 three	 broader	 themes.	 These	 are	 security,	
economic	 relations	 and	 ethical	 concerns.	 Security	 includes	 the	 topics:	MH17,	 the	 Ukraine	
crisis,	 Crimea’s	 incorporation,	 the	 shared	 neighbourhood	 and	 diplomatic	 incidents.	
Economic	 relations	 concern	 trade,	 energy	 and	 sanctions.	 Ethical	 concerns	 hold	 the	 topic	
‘human	rights’.	By	grouping	the	topics	together	into	themes,	connections	between	them	can	
be	made.	 The	 goal	 of	 this	 study	 is	 to	 create	 greater	 understanding	 of	 the	 Russian-Dutch	
relations.	
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2.	Literature	review	
2.1	Russia-EU	relations			
EU-Russian	institutional	framework	
Relations	between	 the	Netherlands	 and	Russia	 cannot	be	 seen	outside	 the	 context	of	 EU-
Russia	relations.	The	EU	sets	the	framework	of	cooperation	between	the	EU	member	states	
and	Russia.	It	creates	the	legal	and	political	basis,	on	which	member	states	can	develop	their	
bilateral	 relations.	 The	 most	 important	 agreements	 are	 the	 Partnership	 for	 Cooperation	
Agreement	 (PCA),	 Human	 Rights	 Dialogue,	 and	 the	 Partnership	 for	 Modernization.	 The	
relations	 between	 Russia	 and	 the	 EU	 are	 institutionalized	 to	 a	 large	 extent.	 Most	 of	 the	
agreements	focus	on	economic	cooperation	or	on	conditions	that	make	doing	business	more	
stable,	such	as	strengthening	the	rule	of	law	and	anti-corruption	measures.	
	
Russian	approach	to	EU	member	states	
How	Russia	deals	with	the	EU	member	states	is	useful	to	compare	with	the	way	it	treats	the	
Netherlands.	According	to	Lo	(2015,	3),	the	Kremlin	believes	the	international	environment	
acts	 in	Hobbesian	 terms:	 a	 tough	place	where	 the	 strong	 rule	and	 the	weak	get	used	and	
beaten.	In	this	world	great	powers	dominate,	here	geopolitical	influence	and	hard	power	are	
important	(Ibid.).	
The	 Russian	 government	 believes	 we	 live	 in	 a	 multi-polar	 world:	 a	 world	 with	 a	
couple	of	great	powers	(Monaghan	2013,	5;	Lo	2015,	3;	Lo	2012).	These	are	the	USA,	China	
and	it	believes	Russia	is	or	is	becoming	a	major	pole	as	well.	This	rests	on	the	assumptions	
that	 the	 ‘West’	 is	 in	 decline	 and	 that	 there	 is	 a	 shift	 towards	 the	 ‘East’	 (China,	 India	 and	
Russia),	as	appears	from	the	Russian	MFA’s	Foreign	Policy	Concept	(Russian	MFA	2013d,	par.	
4,	6).	
Russia	 is	said	to	play	a	divide-and-rule	game	between	the	EU	member	states	(Jong	
2016).	This	was	mentioned	to	be	the	general	conception,	but	not	everybody	agreed	with	this	
idea	(Gerrits	2013;	Lo	2015).	According	to	Leonard	and	Popescu,	Russia	made	bilateral	deals	
because	 it	 is	 in	 its	 best	 interest,	 not	 necessarily	 to	 play	 others	 off	 against	 one	 another	
(Leonard	and	Popescu	2007,	14).	 It	charms	the	bigger	players,	while	 it	coerces	 the	weaker	
ones.	Lo	argued	Russia	does	not	think	so	much	in	divide	and	rule	tactics,	but	considers	the	
EU	as	a	useless	political	player	because	too	many	different	(national)	interests	play	a	role	in	
EU	policy	(Lo	2012,	5).	He	thought	Russia	only	takes	the	EU	serious	as	a	trade	bloc	(ibid.).	It	
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does	 seem	 to	 be	 true	 Russia	 prefers	 to	 deal	 with	 countries	 at	 a	 bilateral	 level	 to	 a	
multilateral	level,	depending	on	the	issue.	However,	while	Russia	sometimes	applies	‘divide	
and	rule’	as	a	tactic,	it	has	no	clear	strategy	to	divide	and	rule	the	EU	member	states;	it	acts	
pragmatically.	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	 see	 whether	 this	 tactic	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 Russian-Dutch	
relations. 
	
2.2	Russian-Dutch	relations		
Russian-Dutch	relations	
Leonard	 and	 Popescu	 identified	 five	 different	 categories	 for	 EU	member	 states,	 based	 on	
how	 they	 approach	 Russia.	 These	 five	 approaches	 are:	 Trojan	 horse;	 strategic	 partner;	
friendly	 pragmatist;	 frosty	 pragmatist;	 and	new	 cold	warrior	 (Leonard	 and	Popescu	2007).	
These	are	useful	for	positioning	the	Dutch	approach	in	a	broader	perspective.	Leonard	and	
Popescu	 put	 the	 Netherlands	 in	 the	 ‘frosty	 pragmatist’	 category.	 They	 argued	 that	 the	
Netherlands	did	not	put	the	Russian	concerns	above	a	common	EU	eastern-neighbourhood	
policy,	regardless	of	the	strong	economic	ties.	They	argued	that	the	Netherlands	was	willing	
to	raise	human	rights	as	along	as	it	did	not	endanger	trade	(Leonard	and	Popescu	2007,	45).	
Casier	 argued	 the	 latter	 as	 well	 (Casier	 2011,	 240-243).	 Putting	 his	 findings	 into	 the	 five	
categories,	the	Netherlands	would	apply	a	‘frosty	pragmatic’	approach	too.	
However,	 according	 to	Gerrits	 the	Netherlands	was	 a	 pragmatist,	 but	 not	 a	 frosty	
one.	 He	 argued,	 human	 rights	 were	 being	 raised	 less	 and	 less	 in	 the	 years	 leading	 up	 to	
2010,	 while	 the	 human	 rights	 situation	 in	 Russia	 deteriorated	 (Gerrits	 2013,	 103).	 He	
believed	the	Netherlands	left	the	difficult	issues	to	the	EU	and	focused	on	the	success	stories	
in	bilateral	relations	(Gerrits	2013,	96).	It	is	interesting	to	examine	how	this	developed	after	
this	period.	
In	the	literature	different	topics	were	used	to	research	the	relations	between	Russia	
and	 the	 Netherlands.	 The	main	 topics	 that	 come	 back	 in	 them	 are	 trade,	 energy,	 human	
rights,	and	the	policy	on	common	neighbours.	
	
Trade		
The	 literature	 examined	 trade	 because	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 Russia	were	 important	 trade	
partners	of	each	other,	as	 the	Netherlands	was	one	of	Russia’s	 largest	export	destinations	
(Leonard	 and	 Popescu	 2007;	 Casier	 2011;	 Gerrits	 2013,	 102).	 When	 talking	 about	 the	
significance	 of	 Russian-Dutch	 trade,	 however,	 it	 has	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 that	 this	 is	
partly	because	of	 the	port	of	Rotterdam,	where	many	products	are	re-exported	and	never	
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leave	their	container	in	the	Netherlands	(Leonard	and	Popescu	2007,	45;	Dutch	MFA	2013d,	
7;	Gerrits	2013,	102).		
Another	 reason	why	 they	used	 it	 is	 because	 trade	promotion	 is	 a	 responsibility	 of	
the	 EU	member	 states.	 The	 national	 governments	 pursue	 business	 contracts	with	 Russian	
companies	and	authorities,	set	 in	a	EU-Russia	 framework.	Hence,	 it	 is	useful	 for	examining	
the	bilateral	relations.	
Even	though	energy	is	part	of	trade	in	terms	of	trade	figures,	it	got	a	specific	section	
in	the	 literature.	This	 is	because	energy	accounted	for	a	 large	part	of	the	EU-Russian	trade	
and	 because	 energy	 exports	 were	 important	 for	 Russian	 state	 revenue	 (Leonard	 and	
Popescu	 2007).	 Energy	 is	 important	 for	 the	 EU	 because	 some	 countries	 –	 especially	 in	
eastern	Europe	–	are	almost	 completely	dependent	on	Russian	energy	 (European	External	
Action	 Service	 2016).	 	 It	 is	 used	 as	 a	 key	 issue	of	 Russian-Dutch	 relations	 because	 several	
large	Dutch	companies	are	very	active	in	Russia	and	because	of	the	Dutch	desire	to	become	
a	gas	hub	for	north-western	Europe	(Casier	2011,	242-243;	Gerrits	2013,	102).		
	
Human	rights	
The	 topic	 ‘human	 rights’	 is	 another	 aspect	 often	 discussed	when	 examining	 the	 relations	
between	 Russia	 and	 the	 Netherlands.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 Netherlands	 sees	 itself	 as	 a	
defender	of	human	rights	on	the	 international	stage	 (Gerrits	2013,	103;	Dutch	MFA	2016).	
Furthermore,	Russia	and	the	EU	differ	on	their	view	of	human	rights.	This	also	appears	from	
Russia’s	Foreign	Policy	Concept	where	it	stated	one	of	its	basic	goals	to	be	“…promoting,	in	
various	 international	 formats,	 Russia’s	 approach	 to	 human	 rights	 issues”	 (Russian	 MFA	
2013d,	par.	4g).		
	 The	existing	literature	looked	at	how	critical	the	Netherlands	was	on	human	rights	in	
Russia.	Gerrits	argued,	human	 rights	had	become	 less	 important	 in	bilateral	 relations	with	
Russia,	because	the	Netherlands	did	not	believe	it	brought	the	desired	results	and	because	
of	 general	 budget	 cuts	 (Gerrits	 2013,	 104).	 Furthermore,	 he	 argued	 that	 the	 Dutch	
government	believed	human	rights	were	best	improved	through	international	organizations	
that	Russia	is	part	of,	such	as	the	Council	of	Europe	(ibid.).	
Gerrits	 and	 Casier	 argued	 (until	 2011),	 the	 Netherlands	 did	 raise	 human	 rights	 in	
dealing	with	Russia,	but	did	so	only	when	it	did	not	endanger	its	economic	interests	(Gerrits	
2013,	 103-104;	 Casier	 2011,	 241).	 Casier	 raised	 an	 interesting	 observation	 about	 the	
difference	 in	 statements	 of	 the	 Dutch	 ambassador	 to	 Russia	 in	 an	 interview	 with	 The	
Moscow	Times	in	2009.	In	it,	the	Dutch	ambassador	said	relations	were	as	good	as	they	had	
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ever	been	and	there	were	“no	real	issues”,	but	in	the	same	answer	said	there	was	room	to	
discuss	 “controversial	 issues”	 (Moscow	 Times	 2009;	 Casier	 2011,	 241).	 This	 shows	 the	
controversial	issues	(e.g.	human	rights)	were	no	obstacles	for	good	bilateral	relations.		
In	2004	the	Dutch	minister	of	foreign	affairs	was	critical	of	how	Russia	handled	the	
Beslan	hostage	crisis.	These	remarks	caused	political	 incidents	where	Russia	banned	flower	
imports	 from	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 possibly	 explain	 the	 restrictive	 measures	 against	 Shell	
(Gerrits	 2013,	 100).	 Possibly,	 such	 a	 relation	 between	 economic	 measures	 and	 criticism	
occurred	later	as	well.		
	
Policy	on	common	neighbours	
The	policy	of	 the	Netherlands	and	Russia	 towards	 their	common	 (EU-Russia)	neighbours	 is	
another	 topic	 discussed	 in	 the	 literature	when	 examining	 bilateral	 relations	 (Leonard	 and	
Popescu	 2007;	 Gerrits	 2013).	 Support	 for	 integration	 into	 Western	 structures	 of	 EU	 and	
NATO	 opposed	 to	 Russian	 structures	 of	 Eurasian	 Economic	 Union	 (EEU)	 and	 Collective	
Security	Treaty	Organisation	(CSTO)	could	be	seen	as	a	source	of	conflict.	
The	 common	 EU-Russia	 neighbours	 were	 an	 important	 issue	 for	 both	 the	
Netherlands	and	Russia	because	this	common	neighbourhood	was	crucial	 for	their	security	
architecture.	 According	 to	 Gerrits,	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 viewed	 the	 Eastern	
Partnership	(EaP)	and	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	(ENP)	as	mutually	beneficial	projects	
and	a	means	to	create	a	ring	of	stable	countries	surrounding	the	EU	(Gerrits	2013,	106).	The	
Netherlands	saw	the	EaP	and	ENP	as	a	way	to	expand	its	(EU’s)	alleged	universal	norms	of	
human	 rights,	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 democracy	 (ibid.).	 However,	 Russia	 viewed	 the	 EaP	 as	 an	
attempt	 of	 the	 EU	 to	 diminish	 Russian	 influence	 in	 these	 countries.	 Russia	 saw	 this	
neighbourhood	as	its	‘near	abroad’	where	it	has	special	interests.	
Leonard	and	Popescu	examined	whether	a	country	followed	a	‘Russia-first’	policy	in	
the	 EU’s	 eastern	 neighbourhood	 (Leonard	 and	 Popescu	 2007).	 Gerrits	 (2013,	 106-107)	
argued	the	Netherlands	actively	supported	the	EaP,	and	did	not	follow	a	‘Russia-first’	policy	
in	the	neighbourhood.	Leonard	and	Popescu	(2007,	47)	also	argued	the	Netherlands	did	not	
put	Russian	concerns	above	a	common	EU	eastern	neighbourhood	policy,	but	only	as	long	as	
it	 did	 not	 endanger	 economic	 relations	 with	 Russia.	 Thus,	 they	 hold	 a	 more	 balanced	
conclusion	 that	 the	 Netherlands	 favoured	 eastern	 Europe,	 but	 only	 to	 a	 certain	 extent.	
Casier,	 however,	 who	 focused	 on	 European	 integration	 in	 these	 countries,	 argued	 the	
Netherlands	held	a	Russia-first	policy	because	 it	did	not	 support	EU	 integration	of	eastern	
European	 countries	 (Casier	 2011,	 240).	 However,	 Casier’s	 parameter	 tells	more	 about	 the	
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Dutch	EU-enlargement	policy	in	general,	than	about	its	willingness	to	cooperate	with	these	
countries.	 A	 EU	member	 state	 can	 oppose	 EU	membership	 of	 the	 EaP	 countries,	 but	 still	
favour	 cooperation	 and	 integration	 with	 European	 values,	 rules	 and	 integration	 in	 its	
economic	structures.		
So	far,	we	know	that	the	existing	literature	mainly	focused	on	the	interplay	with	the	
EU	and	it	only	examined	the	Russian-Dutch	relations	until	20111.	Therefore	one	could	argue,	
the	 academic	 writing	 on	 the	 Russian-Dutch	 relations	 is	 underdeveloped	 and	more	 recent	
research	 in	 Russian-Dutch	 relations	 is	 needed.	 Moreover,	 it	 can	 be	 concluded	 that	 the	
literature	 examined	 the	 topics	 trade,	 energy,	 human	 rights	 and	 policy	 on	 common	
neighbours,	 in	 order	 to	 analyse	 Russian-Dutch	 relations.	 The	methodology	 examines	what	
the	 key	 topics	were	after	2011	and	discusses	how	 these	are	 selected	and	analysed	 in	 this	
study.		
																																																								
1	The	article	of	Gerrits	was	written	in	the	end	of	2010	or	beginning	2011,	despite	it	being	published	in	2013.	He	
mentioned	the	2008	invasion	of	Georgia	was	“only	two	years	ago”	and	the	most	recent	sources	cited	in	his	article	
are	from	December	2010	(Gerrits	2013,	95).	
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3.	Methodology	
3.1	Research	subject	
Research	objective		
The	objective	of	this	study	is	to	create	greater	understanding	of	Russian-Dutch	relations.	 It	
maps	 out	 how	 the	 relations	 have	 developed	 since	 2013,	 up	 to	 and	 including	 2015,	 and	
pinpoints	 the	 key	 changes.	 Additionally,	 it	 explains	 how	 they	 view	 each	 other	 within	 a	
political	context	over	a	set	period	of	time.	
The	 period	 2013-2015	 has	 been	 chosen	 because	 it	 revolves	 around	 the	 alleged	
turning	 point	 of	 2014	 in	 Russian-Dutch	 relations.	 To	 examine	 how	 the	 relations	 changed	
since	2014,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	 set	a	baseline	 for	how	relations	were	before	 it	and	compare	
this	with	the	way	relations	were	after.	The	year	2013	is	a	good	starting	point	to	analyse	how	
relations	deteriorated	later,	since	it	was	the	‘Russia-Netherlands	Year’	that	was	supposed	to	
highlight	the	excellent	relations.		
	
Topic	selection	
This	study	discusses	several	topics	to	answer	the	research	question.	 In	contrast	to	previous	
literature,	the	findings	of	the	research	select	the	topics.	The	literature	argued	key	issues	of	
the	 Russian-Dutch	 relations	were	 trade,	 energy,	 human	 rights	 and	 the	 policy	 on	 common	
neighbours.	This	thesis	does	not	simply	copy	these	specific	topics,	because	it	examines	what	
both	 governments	 communicate	 to	 the	 public.	 By	 only	 looking	 at	 human	 rights,	 trade,	
energy	 and	 policy	 on	 common	 neighbours	 the	 study	would	 be	 too	 focused	 on	 the	 Dutch	
interests,	as	the	choice	of	the	parameters	would	largely	decide	the	outcome.	Furthermore,	
much	has	changed	since	the	last	academic	literature	of	2011	and	other	issues	have	become	
more	 pressing.	 The	 findings	 formed	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 key	 subjects	 used	 in	 this	 study,	
because	 some	 topics	 were	 important	 one	 year,	 but	 not	 the	 other.	 The	 topics	 that	 were	
raised	 in	15%	or	more	of	one	year’s	 communiqués	are	 the	key	 topics	and	chapters	 in	 this	
thesis. 2 	These	 are:	 MH17,	 the	 Ukraine	 crisis,	 Crimea’s	 incorporation,	 the	 shared	
neighbourhood,	 diplomatic	 incidents,	 trade,	 energy,	 sanctions	 and	 human	 rights.	 In	 the	
appendix	a	list	of	all	the	topics	and	their	annual	scores	can	be	found.	
																																																								
2 	With	 the	 exception	 of	 ‘energy’,	 which	 is	 included	 because	 of	 its	 close	 relation	 to	 trade	 but	 separate	
development.	
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The	 above	 literature,	 researched	 the	 relations	 drawing	 on	 personal	 experience,	
interviews	with	officials,	other	academic	literature	and	sometimes	a	government	document.	
This	 study	 examines	 the	 relations	 by	 looking	 at	 government	 communiqués.	 How	
governments	 talk	 about	one	another	 can	be	 seen	as	 a	 reflection	of	 the	 state	of	 relations.	
This	 study	 looks	 at	 all	 the	 communiqués	 and	 gives	 numerical	 values	 in	 order	 to	make	 the	
operationalization	as	objective	as	possible.		
In	order	 to	do	 so	 the	websites	of	 the	governments	are	 researched	 systemically	by	
year	 and	 by	 communiqué.	 Looking	 for	 references	 of	 either	 Russia	 or	 the	 Netherlands	 in	
statements,	 speeches,	 publications,	 Q&As,	 press	 releases	 and	 other	 documents.	 The	
documents	of	the	ministries	of	foreign	affairs	(MFA)	and	the	heads	of	state	or	government	
form	the	core	sources	of	 this	 thesis.	 Since	a	choice	had	 to	be	made	because	of	 space	and	
time	 limitations,	 only	 the	 heads	 of	 state	 or	 government	 and	 the	 MFA’s	 are	 used.	 The	
ministries	 of	 foreign	 affairs,	 which	 include	 the	 embassies,	 and	 the	 head	 of	 state	 or	
government	are	 the	primary	 representative	of	a	 country	abroad.	Other	ministries,	 such	as	
the	ministry	of	economic	affairs,	play	a	role	abroad	as	well.	However,	the	former	present	a	
more	comprehensive	foreign	policy,	more	representative	of	the	government	as	a	whole.	
		
3.2	Operationalization	
Subject	analysis	
As	 is	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 research	 shape	 the	 topics	 and	 chapters.	 The	
topics	 are	 grouped	 together	 in	 broader	 themes.	 These	 themes	 are	 security,	 economic	
relations,	and	ethical	concerns.	Each	subject	is	structured	as	follows:	first,	the	topic	is	briefly	
introduced.	 Then	 each	 chapter	 identifies	 the	 developments	 in	 statements	 regarding	 each	
topic	 over	 time.	 These	 developments	 are	 presented	 chronologically	 and	 form	 the	 sub-
chapters	of	each	 issue.	 Examples	 from	 the	 communiqués	 clarify	 the	developments	 in	how	
both	 countries	 talk	 each	 other	 in	 their	 communiqués.	 These	 developments	 are	 analysed	
throughout	 the	 chapters	 by	 looking	 at	 what	 else	 happened	 at	 the	 moment	 in	 bilateral	
relations.		
	
Research	operationalization	
Each	 communiqué	 is	 allocated	 an	 overall	 value.	 Additionally,	 the	 study	 distils	 the	 topics	
discussed	in	each	communiqué	and	gives	these	a	value	as	well.	The	values	range	from	‘-2’	to	
‘+2’.	 A	 score	 of	 -2	means	 the	 communiqué	 is	 very	 negative;	 -1	 is	 negative;	 0	 is	mixed	 or	
neutral;	 1	 is	 positive;	 and	 2,	 is	 very	 positive.	 The	 value	 assesses	 how	 both	 countries	 talk	
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about	 each	 other	 regarding	 the	 topics.	 It	 is	 assessed	 as	 being	 ‘positive’	 when	 it	 aids	 in	
building	 a	 constructive	 partnership	 and	 ‘negative’	 when	 it	 is	 detrimental	 to	 such	 a	
partnership.	Even	a	disagreement	or	 incident	can	be	discussed	in	a	positive	manner.	These	
values	 are	 used	 to	 construct	 all	 the	 tables	 that	 show	 the	 developments	 for	 each	 topic	 by	
year	 and	 the	overall	 developments	of	 relations	 through	 the	 years.	 I	 specifically	developed	
this	method	for	this	research,	in	order	to	make	general	‘positive’	or	‘negative’	assessments	
of	relations	less	arbitrary		
The	 general	 criteria	 adopted	 for	 the	 values	 are	 crucial	 to	 the	 research.	 They	 are	
based	on	standard	diplomatic	and	legal	phraseology	or	commonly	used	terms.	If	the	content	
of	a	communiqué	falls	within	the	criteria	provided,	 it	 is	given	a	corresponding	value.	Other	
words	 and	 phraseology	 are	 also	 used	 in	 the	 communiqués.	 When	the	 meaning	 or	 the	
content	of	 the	 statements	 comes	 close	 to	or	matches	 the	 criteria,	 it	 is	 allocated	 the	 same	
value.			
The	general	criteria	for	the	values	are	as	follows:	a	topic	is	described	as	being	‘very	
negative’	 when	 a	 country	 strongly	 condemns,	 expresses	 great	 concern	 or	 refers	 to	
something	 as	 being	 unacceptable.	 It	 is	 described	 as	 being	 ‘negative’	 when	 a	 country	
expresses	 (regular)	 concern,	 condemns,	 or	 is	 disappointed	 by	 an	 action.	 However,	 the	
‘mixed	or	neutral’	value	is	given	in	the	case:	positive	and	negative	statements	are	combined;	
an	 action	 is	 disapproved	 but	 understood;	 or	when	 an	 assessment	 is	 absent	 or	 avoided.	 A	
subject	is	described	as	being	‘positive’	when	parties	agree	with	or	support	each	other	on	the	
subject	or	the	desire	to	cooperate	 is	expressed.	A	topic	is	‘very	positive’	when	it	is	praised,	
the	excellent	or	good	state	of	the	topic	is	emphasized	and	nothing	critical	or	negative	is	said.		
	
Figure	1:	General	criteria	for	assessing	the	communiqués	
Value	 Criteria	
Very	negative	 Strongly	condemn	 Express	great	concern	
Refer	to	something	as	
being	unacceptable	
Negative	 Condemn	 Express	concern	 Express	disappointment	
Mixed	or	neutral	
Combination	of	
positive	and	negative	
statements	
Disapprove,	but	
understand	
Assessment	absent	or	
avoided	
Positive	 Support	 Agree	with	 Express	desire	to	cooperate	
Very	positive	
Praise	 Emphasize	excellent	or	good	state	
(precondition)	Nothing	
critical	is	stated		
Source:	author’s	table	
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	 The	websites	 of	 the	 Dutch	MFA,	 the	 Russian	MFA,	 the	 Dutch	 prime	minister	 (the	
Ministry	of	General	Affairs)	and	the	Russian	president	(the	Kremlin)	provide	the	documents	
used	 in	 this	 study.	 Search	 terms	 for	 Russia	were	 “Netherlands;	 Dutch;	 Rutte”	 and	 for	 the	
Netherlands	“Rusland;	Russische	Federatie;	Poetin”.		A	document	is	used	when	it	has	at	least	
a	 section	 directly	 discussing	 or	 appertaining	 to	 the	 other	 country,	 not	 when	 it	 is	 only	
mentioned.	 The	 study	 does	 not	 take	 into	 consideration	 the	 press	 releases	 that	 state	 a	
meeting	will	take	place.	
The	communiqués	are	collected	and	used	 to	create	a	dataset.	This	dataset	 is	used	
for	examining	the	general	trend	in	Russian-Dutch	relations	and	for	the	developments	of	each	
topic.	I	compiled	a	database	of	162	communiqués	from	the	Russian	and	Dutch	governments	
from	 the	 period	 2013-2015,	 applying	 the	 above-mentioned	 selection	 process.	 From	 this	
data,	 I	 constructed	 tables	 and	 graphs.	 Using	 this	 numerical	 operationalization	 and	
visualization,	makes	it	easier	to	evaluate	the	developments.	
	
3.3	Determining	priorities	
First	and	second	order	issues	
The	 literature	 often	 used	 the	 distinction	 between	 first	 order	 and	 second	 order	 issues	 to	
explain	the	hierarchy	in	interests	of	EU	member	states,	in	relations	with	Russia	(Casier	2011;	
Gerrits	 2013;	 Leonard	 and	 Popescu	 2007).	 This	 in	 turn	 would	 explain	 what	 issues	 a	 EU	
member	state	raised	in	statements	about	Russia,	and	which	issues	it	would	leave	to	the	EU	
to	discuss.	According	to	this	division,	countries	tend	to	deal	with	first	order	issues	–	national	
interests	and	security	–	at	the	bilateral	level	(Casier	2011,	243).	The	second	order	issues	are	
ethical	concerns,	which	are	dealt	with	multilaterally.	This	way	 tensions	based	upon	ethical	
concerns,	such	as	human	rights,	do	not	damage	the	bilateral	relations.	Only	when	first	order	
interests	 are	not	 at	 risk,	will	 a	 EU	member	 state	 raise	 second	order	 issues	at	 the	bilateral	
level	 (ibid.).	 However,	 according	 to	 Gerrits	 (2013)	 this	 hierarchy	 in	 determining	 interests	
does	not	always	hold	true.	He	argued	national	governments	attach	political	weight	to	issues,	
based	 on	 other	 aspects	 such	 as	 specific	 economic	 interests,	 historical	 and	 cultural	
‘sensitivities’	 (Gerrits	 2013,	 101).	 Most	 authors	 who	 have	 written	 about	 Russian-Dutch	
relations,	 have	done	 so	within	 the	 context	of	Member	 State-EU	 relations.	 This	 study	does	
not	examine	the	relation	between	the	‘EU	member	state’	and	the	EU.	Hence,	a	different	but	
similar	theory	seems	to	fit.	
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Primary	and	secondary	national	interests		
Another	approach	to	view	the	distinction	between	primary	and	secondary	national	interests.	
It	is	more	useful	in	explaining	changes	in	a	country’s	attitude	towards	Russia,	since	it	leaves	
more	 room	 for	 discussing	 shifting	 priorities	 within	 the	 ‘first	 order	 issues’.	 The	 ‘first-order	
issues’	discussed	above,	include	primary	and	secondary	national	interests.	
The	 concept	of	primary-secondary	national	 interests	has	many	difficulties	 and	 it	 is	
not	 in	the	scope	of	this	study	to	discuss	these.3	Nonetheless,	a	 ‘simple’	definition	from	the	
realist	school	of	international	relations	 is	used,	because	 it	helps	understand	changes	in	how	
both	 countries	 talk	 about	 each	 other	 in	 the	 communiqués.	 In	 this	 common	 definition,	
primary	 national	 interests	 of	 governments	 are:	 to	 protect	 its	 citizens,	 ensure	 the	
continuation	 of	 the	 state,	 protect	 the	 state’s	 territorial	 integrity	 and	 to	 protect	 the	main	
political	 institutions	 (Knapen,	 et	 al.	 2011,	 46).	 These	 features	 of	 the	 definition	 are	mostly	
agreed	upon	 (ibid.).	Other	 interests	 are	 said	 to	 be	 ‘primary’	 as	well,	 but	 are	 left	 out	 here	
because	they	are	contentious.	Secondary	national	 interests	can	be	seen	as	all	non-primary	
national	interests.	Within	these	there	is	also	a	hierarchy.	Economic	interests	for	example	are	
sometimes	seen	as	primary	national	interests,	but	can	also	be	seen	as	important	secondary	
national	 interests	 (Knapen,	 et	 al.	 2011,	 48).	 Normative	 or	 ethical	 interests	 (second	 order	
issues)	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 non-national	 interests,	 since	 they	 do	 not	 directly	 involve	 a	 state’s	
citizens,	 institutions	 or	 territory.	 The	 distinction	 between	 primary	 and	 secondary	 national	
interests	clarifies	developments	in	how	both	countries	report	on	each	other,	since	it	helps	to	
explain	changes	in	priorities.		
	
3.4	Research	limitations		
Limitations		
The	study	of	Russian-Dutch	relations	needs	further	research	because	it	is	out-dated	and	the	
assessments	 that	 have	 been	 made	 are	 quite	 arbitrary.	 The	 research	 operationalization	
explained	 above	 is	 less	 arbitrary.	 As	 with	 any	 research,	 however,	 this	 study	 has	 its	
limitations.	By	clearly	stating	these	it	is	easier	to	improve	the	research	and	see	how	its	limits	
are	minimized.	Because	of	language	limitations,	Russian-language	sources	are	not	included.	
However,	 the	 Russian	 government	 publishes	 much	 in	 English,	 and	 the	 choice	 of	 what	 to	
translate	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 selection	 of	 what	 is	 important	 to	 the	 government.	 Further	
research	 with	 Russian-language	 knowledge	 could	 still	 strengthen	 the	 analysis	 of	 Russian-																																																								
3	Who	decides	what	the	interests	of	a	country	are?	Is	the	interest	a	goal	or	means	of	influence?		Is	an	interest	
long-	or	short-term?	Can	the	protection	of	citizens	of	other	states	be	a	national	interest?	
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Dutch	relations.	Note	that	the	Dutch	quotations	are	personal	translations.	When	the	Dutch	
government	 is	 quoted	 as	 saying	 something,	 it	 is	 the	 author’s	 translation	 and	 for	 practical	
reasons	the	original	Dutch	text	is	not	provided	on	each	occasion.	
The	study	says	more	on	the	Dutch	position	than	the	Russian	position.	By	looking	at	
the	English	sources	of	the	Russian	MFA	and	other	official	government	sources	that	publish	in	
English	 this	 effect	 is	 reduced.	 On	 some	 of	 the	 topics	 Russia	 said	 nothing	 about	 the	
Netherlands.	 For	 these	 the	 Russian	 view	 on	 the	 topics	 in	 general	 is	 used,	 to	 see	 how	 it	
differed	with	the	Dutch	view.	Furthermore,	total	objectivity	is	impossible,	since	I	have	grown	
up	under	 certain	 contexts	 and	 conditions	 and	even	 choosing	what	 to	 research	 and	not	 to	
research	is	already	a	political	choice.		
An	 important	 issue	 for	 this	 study	 is	 that	 communiqués	 are	 usually	 diplomatic,	
politically	 correct	 and	 disagreements	 are	 not	 openly	 raised.	 Hence,	 the	 statements	 take	
close	 reading	 to	 discover	 developments	 and	 deduce	 the	 reasons	 of	 the	 changes.	
Furthermore,	when	a	communiqué	is	critical,	it	says	even	more	about	the	gravity	of	it	or	on	
the	general	state	of	 relations.	For	the	purpose	of	 this	 research	 it	 is	not	necessary	to	 judge	
what	 is	 ‘true’	or	who	 is	 right,	but	 its	purpose	 is	 to	present	the	changes	 in	how	critically	or	
friendly	 they	 talk	 about	 each	 other	 and	 give	 possible	 explanations	 for	 these.	 Before	
examining	 the	 key	 topics,	 first	 the	 general	 development	 of	 the	 relations	 is	 described,	 in	
order	to	later	see	how	the	topics	differ	from	the	most	important	turning	points	in	Russian-
Dutch	relations.		
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4.	General	development	of	relations		
	
Graphic	visualisation	
Figure	2	below	depicts	the	overall	development	of	relations	over	time.	The	starting	point,	0-
value,	 of	 the	 graph	 is	 1	 January	 2013.	 The	 graph	 accumulates	 the	 values	 of	 each	
communiqué,	to	show	the	developments	in	each	country’s	attitude	towards,	or	reaction	to,	
changes	in	policy	or	current	events.	This	is	the	state	of	relations	over	the	years,	based	on	all	
the	 selected	 communiqués.	 The	 communiqués	are	added	or	 subtracted	 from	 the	previous	
communiqué,	depending	on	their	value.	This	results	into	an	accumulated	value	that	can	be	
seen	as	a	reflection	of	the	developments	in	Russian-Dutch	relations.	
	
Figure	2:	Development	of	Russian-Dutch	relations	2013-2015	
	
Source:	Author’s	graph	based	on	values	of	all	communiqués	
	
The	 graph	 is	 based	 on	 the	 overall	 score	 of	 each	 communiqué,	 not	 the	 separate	
topics.	Using	only	 the	overall	 score	of	each	 communiqué	 is	 a	better	 representation	of	 the	
state	of	relations	at	that	moment.	Additionally,	some	topics	discussed	are	so	closely	related,	
weighing	 them	 separately	would	 distort	 the	 results,	 for	 example	 human	 rights	 and	 LGBT.	
These	two	were	usually	discussed	in	the	same	communiqué,	but	LGBT	rights	correlates	with	
human	rights.	Related	topics	are	categorized	separately	in	order	to	gain	more	insight	in	the	
elements	that	influence	the	broader	topics.	All	communiqués	are	given	the	same	weighting.	
Some	 events	 are	 more	 important	 than	 others	 for	 the	 relations,	 but	 because	 these	 are	
discussed	more	often	their	importance	is	incorporated	in	the	results	this	way.	
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General	trend	
The	general	trend	was	that	communiqués	could	be	described	as	being	‘positive’	in	2013	and	
they	became	more	negative	 after	 the	 incorporation	of	Crimea	 in	March	2014	and	a	while	
after	 the	downing	of	MH17	 in	 July	2014.	The	developments	mentioned	 in	 this	chapter	are	
explained	in	more	detail	in	the	chapters	below.		
The	relations	were	improving	until	April	2013,	because	the	positive	communications	
in	 light	 of	 the	 2013	 Russia-Netherlands	 Year,	 which	 celebrated	 400	 years	 of	 relations	
between	 the	 two	countries.	 In	 the	beginning	of	2013	 the	 relations	between	 the	 two	were	
described	 as	 friendly	 (Kremlin	 2013c),	 but	 many	 incidents	 happened	 that	 strained	 the	
relations.	Therefore,	from	April	until	September	2013	the	value	remained	steady	instead	of	
going	up.	There	were	several	incidents,	but	at	the	same	time	the	discussion	on	human	rights	
was	 neutral.	 In	 September	 2013	 the	 relations	 deteriorated	 because	 of	 the	 Arctic	 Sunrise	
incident.	 However,	 both	 countries	 believed	 the	 year	 should	 not	 be	 overshadowed	 by	 the	
incidents	 and	 stated	 their	 commitment	 to	 move	 past	 the	 incidents	 (Dutch	 Ministry	 of	
General	Affairs	2013b;	Kremlin	2013c).	This	can	be	seen	in	the	general	development	of	the	
relations	in	figure	2,	as	by	the	end	of	the	year	the	trend	became	more	positive.	
During	2014	the	Russian-Dutch	relations	deteriorated.	The	average	annual	value	of	
the	 communiqués	 deteriorated	 from	 0.13	 in	 2013	 to	 -0.25	 in	 2014.	 In	 figure	 2,	 this	 is	
reflected	with	the	accumulated	score	going	below	zero	for	more	than	a	month	for	the	first	
time.	 Until	 February	 2014,	 the	 government	 communications	 on	 each	 other	 could	 be	
described	 as	 being	 positive	 and	 the	 relations	 were	 still	 friendly.	 In	 February	 the	 Russian	
president	 stressed	 the	 visit	 of	 the	 Dutch	 prime	 minister	 was	 an	 important	 sign	 of	 the	
longstanding	and	good	relations	(Kremlin	2014a).	Moreover,	 it	shows	the	turbulent	Russia-
Netherlands	year	did	not	damage	the	relations	much.	However,	 this	visit	 in	February	2014	
was	the	last	visit	between	the	Russian	president	and	the	Dutch	prime	minister.	A	couple	of	
weeks	later	Crimea’s	incorporation	occurred	and	since	then	they	only	had	contact	by	phone.	
The	 fact	 that	 the	 two	only	had	contact	over	 the	phone,	and	no	meetings,	 shows	 relations	
had	 already	 cooled	 somewhat	 after	 Crimea’s	 incorporation.	 The	 cumulated	 score	 of	
relations	reached	its	high	 in	February	2014.	The	entry	of	Russian	troops	 into	Crimea	in	the	
end	of	February	and	the	following	incorporation	was	the	start	of	the	deteriorating	relations.		
The	 fall	went	 on	 until	 halfway	 trough	 July.	When	MH17	 crashed	 in	 July	 2014,	 the	
statements	on	each	other	in	the	communiqués	initially	became	positive,	because	Russia	and	
the	Netherlands	 had	much	 contact	 to	 discuss	 how	 the	 investigation	was	 to	 be	 conducted	
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and	were	in	agreement	that	peace	was	needed	(Kremlin	2014b).	About	two	weeks	after	the	
crash	 a	 steep	 fall	 in	 the	bilateral	 relations	 began,	 because	Russia	was	 seen	 as	 inciting	 the	
conflict	 in	Ukraine,	 in	which	MH17	was	downed.	Regarding	MH17	 they	 talked	 about	 each	
other	positively,	but	on	other	topics	the	communiqués	became	negative.	
In	 2015	 the	 communiqués	 continued	 to	 be	 negative	 and	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 topics	
were	discussed	in	a	more	negative	way.	The	average	annual	score	of	the	communiqués	went	
down	from	-0.25	in	2014	to	-0.66	in	2015.	Figure	2	shows	that	the	statements	on	each	other	
became	 more	 negative	 in	 the	 communiqués	 and	 the	 score	 deteriorated	 further	 to	 an	
accumulated	value	of	-45	in	December	2015.		
A	large	drop	occurred	in	May-July	2015.	In	May	2015	the	largest	drop	occurred,	not	
because	 of	 one	 specific	 event,	 but	 because	 the	 Dutch	 MFA	 published	 many	 negative	
communiqués	 on	 several	 topics	 regarding	 Russia	 this	 month.	 Furthermore,	 an	 elaborate	
Dutch	MFA	 document	 on	 relations	 with	 Russia	 was	 published	 and	 it	 emerged	 that	 three	
Dutch	parliamentarians	had	an	entry-ban	for	Russia.	The	second	largest	drop	was	in	the	end	
of	July	2015	when	the	Netherlands	tried	to	establish	a	tribunal	for	the	prosecution	of	those	
responsible	for	downing	MH17	and	Russia	vetoed	this	in	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	
(UNSC).	After	this	the	leaders	of	the	two	countries	completely	ceased	contact.	The	following	
chapters	 describe	 the	 topics	 in	 more	 detail	 and	 explain	 how	 the	 discussion	 about	 each	
developed.	 They	draw	possible	 relations	between	 them	and	explain	why	 some	 followed	a	
different	path.	The	 topics	under	each	 theme	are	not	necessarily	 the	most	significant	or	all	
the	 aspects	 of	 this	 theme.	 They	 are	 the	 issues	 that	 come	 up	 in	 the	 Russian	 and	 Dutch	
communiqués	on	each	other	the	most.	Other	topics	or	themes	might	have	had	a	big	impact	
on	the	relations	as	well.		
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5.	Security		
5.1	MH17		
The	downing	of	MH17	is	possibly	the	most	important	event	for	the	Russian-Dutch	relations.	
Malaysia	Airlines	 flight	MH17	was	a	civilian	aircraft	 that	got	 shot	down	on	17	 July	2014	 in	
eastern	Ukraine.	There	were	298	casualties,	of	which	196	were	Dutch	nationals.	Considering	
the	number	of	Dutch	fatalities	it	was	an	important	event	for	the	Netherlands.	Tony	van	der	
Togt	of	the	think	tank	Clingendael	argued	the	downing	of	the	plane	was	a	game	changer	in	
the	 Dutch-Russian	 relations,	 which	 convinced	 Dutch	 actors,	 including	 the	 business	
community,	 that	 a	 response	 was	 needed	 (van	 der	 Togt	 2015).	 The	 MH17	 crash	 was	
significant	 for	 Russia	 as	 well.	 In	 2015,	 71%	 of	 the	 Russian	 communiqués	 regarding	 the	
Netherlands	 were	 about	MH17.	MH17	 is	 discussed	 the	 first	 of	 the	 issues	 because	 it	 was	
important	to	the	relations	and	had	effect	on	the	other	topics.	
	
Figure	3:	Communiqués	regarding	MH17	
Year	 Percentage	of	
communiqués	in	
which	discussed	
Average	value	
2013	 -	 -	
2014	 23%	 0.25	
2015	 31%	 -0.63	
Source:	Author’s	table4	
	
In	2014	the	crash	was	discussed	in	23%	of	both	countries’	communiqués,	which	can	
be	 seen	 in	 figure	 3.	 Concerning	 the	 crash,	 both	 parties	 talked	 about	 each	 other	 slightly	
positive	 with	 a	 value	 of	 0.25.	 This	 changed	 in	 2015	 when	 both	 countries	 became	 more	
critical	of	each	other.	This	can	be	seen	in	the	average	score	of		-0.63	in	2015,	on	a	scale	from	
‘-2’	(very	negative)	to	‘+2’	(very	positive).		
	
Joint	expression	to	cooperate	
In	2014	the	communiqués	show	both	a	neutral	and	positive	attitude	towards	MH17	by	both	
countries.	 The	 days	 after	 the	 crash,	 the	 Russian	 president	 had	 several	 telephone	
conversations	 with	 the	 Dutch	 prime	 minister	 to	 stress	 the	 importance	 of	 independent	
investigation	 into	 the	 crash,	 and	 both	 parties	 agreed	 on	 this	 (Kremlin	 2014b).	 The	
communications	 on	 each	 other	 concerning	MH17	 remained	 friendly	 in	 2014.	 The	 Russian																																																									
4	The	author	has	compiled	the	data	in	all	tables.	
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communiqués	in	2014	were	slightly	more	positive	at	0.38	than	the	Dutch	communiqués	with	
an	average	score	of	0.	
In	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2015	 the	 statements	 to	 cooperate	 continued	 and	 the	 two	
countries	talked	about	each	other	neutrally	regarding	MH17.	They	agreed	on	the	need	for	an	
independent	 investigation.	 On	 all	 questions	 asked	 by	 journalists,	 the	 Dutch	 government	
refused	to	comment	on	who	they	might	or	might	not	suspect	as	being	involved	in	the	crash,	
because	this	could	affect	an	independent	investigation.	As	the	Dutch	prime	minister	said	on	
27	 February	 2015,	 by	 showing	 possible	 suspicions	 the	 one(s)	 who	will	 be	 accused	 by	 the	
investigation,	 could	 then	 say	 the	 investigation	 was	 not	 independent	 (Dutch	 Ministry	 of	
General	 Affairs	 2015b).	 Not	 talking	 about	 possible	 suspicions	 was	 the	 best	 strategy	 to	
maintain	 international	 support	 for	 the	 next	 step	 of	 the	 investigation,	 prosecution.	 If	 the	
investigation	was	politically	 influenced	from	the	start	 it	would	have	 lost	credibility	and	the	
Dutch	 government	wanted	 to	make	 the	 chance	 of	 prosecution	 as	 high	 as	 possible	 (Dutch	
Ministry	of	General	Affairs	2015b).			
While	 the	Dutch	government	awaited	 the	 results	of	 the	ongoing	 investigation	 into	
who	were	the	alleged	perpetrators	of	the	downing,	 it	did	note	that	the	crash	took	place	in	
the	 context	 of	 a	 conflict	 that	 would	 not	 have	 happened	 without	 Russian	 support	 for	
separatists	 in	eastern	Ukraine	(Dutch	MFA	2015d,	6).	This	shows	the	crash	played	a	role	 in	
the	 bilateral	 relations,	 since	 the	 Netherlands	 holds	 Russia	 at	 least	 partly	 responsible	 for	
creating	the	context	in	which	MH17	was	shot	down.	
	
Disappointment	in	the	MH17	tribunal	and	investigation	
After	 29	 July	 2015	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 they	 talk	 about	 each	 other	 changed	 when	 the	
Netherlands	 tried	 to	 establish	 a	 tribunal	 for	MH17	 and	Russia	 vetoed	 it	 in	 the	UNSC.	 The	
Netherlands,	 together	 with	 a	 couple	 other	 countries,	 put	 forward	 an	 UN	 resolution	 to	
establish	 a	 tribunal	 for	 the	 prosecution	 of	 those	 who	 brought	 down	 flight	 MH17.	 Russia	
exercised	its	veto	powers	in	the	UNSC	to	block	the	resolution.	Russia	argued	the	tribunal	was	
“untimely	and	counterproductive”	(Kremlin	2015a).	Russia	stressed	its	concerns	that	it	was	
not	 fully	 part	 of	 the	 investigation	 and	 the	 Russian	 experts	were	 denied	 full	 access	 to	 the	
evidence	 (Kremlin	 2015b).	 This	 communiqué	 issued	 by	 Russia	 was	 very	 negative	 for	 a	
presidential	 level	 (ibid.),	 since	 it	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 containing	 ‘hidden’	 accusations.	 For	
example,	 the	 Russian	 president	 warned	 for	 politically	 motivated	 leaking	 of	 stories	 of	 the	
events	or	investigation	(ibid.).	This	was	an	indirect	accusation	that	the	Netherlands	did	so	or	
was	willing	to	do	so.		
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The	Dutch	prime	minister	was	“disappointed”	that	the	UN-resolution	to	establish	a	
tribunal	was	not	accepted,	but	he	also	stated	that	he	was	not	surprised	(Dutch	Ministry	of	
General	 Affairs	 2015d).	 In	 his	 reaction	 he	 focused	 on	 the	 determination	 to	 prosecute	 the	
ones	responsible	for	the	crash	and	was	not	negative	about	Russia	(ibid.).	However,	the	day	
Russia	 vetoed	 the	 resolution	 was	 the	 last	 time	 the	 Russian	 president	 and	 Dutch	 prime	
Minster	had	any	contact.5	This	highlights	the	impact	MH17	had	on	Russian-Dutch	relations.	
In	 the	 joint	 statement,	Malaysia,	 Australia,	 Ukraine,	 Belgium	 and	 the	 Netherlands	
said	 they	 were	 “deeply	 disappointed”	 in	 Russia’s	 veto	 (Dutch	 MFA	 2015q).	 In	 its	 own	
statement	 the	 Dutch	 government	 said	 it	 was	 “disappointed”,	 leaving	 out	 ‘deeply’	 (Dutch	
Ministry	 of	General	 Affairs	 2015d).	 It	 is	 possible	 to	 assume	 that	 the	Netherlands	was	 less	
critical	 in	 the	 individual	 statements,	 because	 it	 was	 more	 vulnerable	 without	 the	
international	support.		
	
Russian	disappointment	
After	 the	Netherlands	 tried	 to	establish	 the	 tribunal	 and	Russia	blocked	 it,	 Russia	became	
more	 openly	 critical	 of	 the	 investigation.	 Because	 Russia’s	 points	 were	 not	 heeded,	 it	
deemed	 the	 final	 report	 into	 the	 cause	 of	 the	 crash	 biased	 and	 incomplete	 (Russian	MFA	
2015b).		
Russia	feared	some	states	wanted	to	use	the	tribunal	as	a	pretext	to	put	pressure	on	
Russia	 for	political	 purposes.	However,	 the	Russian	minister	of	 foreign	affairs	 said	 this	did	
not	include	the	Netherlands,	and	he	said	that	the	Netherlands	sincerely	wanted	to	find	the	
truth(Russian	MFA	2015d).	Furthermore,	Russia	felt	it	was	blamed	for	the	downing	of	MH17.	
As	the	Russian	foreign	minister	pointed	out,	the	largest	set	of	sanctions	were	imposed	days	
after	the	downing	of	MH17	(Lavrov	2015a).	The	minister	argued,	the	blame	of	the	crash	was	
immediately	 put	 on	 the	 separatists	 in	 eastern	 Ukraine	 and	 Russia	 was	 deemed	 to	 be	
complicit,	because	it	was	believed	to	have	helped	these	“self-defence”	forces	(ibid.).	
	
Conclusion	
The	Russian	and	Dutch	communiqués	regarding	MH17	did	not	become	negative	in	2014,	as	
the	general	 trend	would	 suggest.	Once	Russia	 in	 the	 second	half	of	2015	 felt	 it	was	being	
blamed	 for	 the	 downing,	 it	 critiqued	 the	 objectivity	 of	 the	 investigation	 and	 these	
communications	became	negative.	When	 the	Netherlands	 tried	 to	establish	a	 tribunal	and	
Russia	 prevented	 it,	 the	 statements	 about	 each	 other	 became	 even	 more	 critical.	 It	 is																																																									
5
	There	still	has	been	no	contact	at	the	time	of	writing	in	March	2017.	
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remarkable	 that	once	 the	crash	happened	the	Dutch	government	became	more	critical	on	
other	subjects	vis-à-vis	Russia,	while	it	did	not	mention	Russian	involvement	or	responsibility	
in	the	crash.	The	Dutch	statement	that	Russia	created	the	context	in	which	MH17	was	shot	
down	can	possibly	 explain	 this.	Additionally,	 its	 priority	 to	prosecute	 the	ones	 responsible	
for	the	crash	offers	an	explanation.	To	do	this	it	tried	to	keep	the	investigation	objective	and	
therefore	 did	 its	 best	 not	 to	 mention	 its	 ‘possible’	 suspicions,	 to	 prevent	 influencing	 the	
investigation.		
 
5.2	Ukraine	crisis	
This	issue	concerns	the	Ukraine	crisis	in	general,	and	involves	the	conflict	in	eastern	Ukraine	
and	 the	Minsk	peace	Agreements,	 separately	 from	Crimea’s	 incorporation.	Figure	4	 shows	
the	 topic	 is	mainly	discussed	 in	2014,	because	 this	 is	when	the	conflict	escalated.	 In	2013,	
tensions	in	Ukraine	rose	with	the	sudden	decision	of	the	Ukrainian	president	not	to	sign	the	
Association	 Agreement	 with	 the	 EU.	 This	 decision	 lead	 to	 protests,	 which	 grew	 stronger	
when	 they	were	harshly	 repressed,	 and	eventually	 lead	 to	 the	ousting	of	 the	president	 in	
February	2014.	Existing	tensions	rose	and	Crimea	became	incorporated	by	Russia.	After	this,	
separatists	 in	 eastern	 Ukraine	 declared	 independence	 and	 took	 up	 arms.	 This	 conflict	 is	
ongoing	even	until	the	day	of	writing.	This	is	the	‘Ukraine	crisis’	in	a	nutshell.	
	
Figure	4:	Communiqués	regarding	the	Ukraine	crisis	
Year	 Percentage	of	
communiqués	in	which	
discussed	
Average	value	
2013	 2%	 0	
2014	 34%	 -0.5	
2015	 16%	 -0.5	
	
There	was	a	difference	 in	how	both	countries	 talked	about	 the	 topic	 in	 relation	 to	
each	other.	From	the	Russian	side	 it	was	mainly	discussed	positively	or	neutrally,	stressing	
that	 both	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 Russia	 agreed	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 ceasefire	 (Kremlin	
2014c).	The	average	value	of	the	topic	in	Russia’s	communiqués	of	2014	is	0.6.	However,	the	
Netherlands	in	its	2014	communications,	regarding	Russia’s	role	in	the	Ukraine	crisis,	has	an	
average	score	of	-0.92.		
	
	
	
	
	 21	
Russia	on	Ukraine	
The	Russian	 government	 denied	 responsibility	 for	 the	 crisis	 and	 said	 the	 EU	 and	 actors	 in	
Ukraine	 caused	 it.	 The	 Russian	minister	 of	 foreign	 affairs	 argued	 the	 export	 of	 European	
values	 triggered	 the	 Ukraine	 crisis,	 and	 said	 especially	 the	 export	 of	 democracy	 caused	
problems	(Lavrov	2017).6	Russia	saw	the	revolution	in	Ukraine	as	a	coup	and	argued	the	EU	
backed	 this	 coup	 (Lavrov	 2015b).	 The	 Russian	 president	 argued	 Ukraine	 attacked	 the	
Donbass	 region	 and	 the	 “self-defence	units”	 there	were	only	defending	 themselves	 (Putin	
2014b).		
Furthermore,	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 Russia	 differed	 in	 opinion	 on	 Russia’s	
involvement	 in	 the	 Ukraine	 crisis.	 The	 Netherlands	 condemned	 Russia’s	 use	 of	 military	
forces,	 while	 Russia	 denied	 the	 use	 of	 forces	 in	 eastern	 Ukraine.	 The	 Russian	 president	
argued	 the	Russian	volunteers	 fighting	 there	were	 following	 their	heart	and	were	 fulfilling	
their	 duty	 (Putin	 2014b).	 In	 December	 2015	 he	 said	 “we’ve	 never	 said	 there	 were	 no	
[Russian]	people	there	who	deal	with	certain	matters,	including	in	the	military	area,	but	this	
does	not	mean	that	regular	Russian	troops	are	present	there”	(Putin	2015).	In	other	words,	
Russia	did	not	deny	Russians	were	 involved	 in	fights	 in	eastern	Ukraine,	 it	 just	emphasized	
they	 were	 not	 send	 there	 by	 the	 government	 and	 did	 so	 voluntarily	 –	 thus	 denying	 any	
responsibility.	
	
Suspension	of	criticism	for	a	ceasefire	
The	Netherlands	reported	negatively	on	Russia’s	role	in	the	Ukraine	crisis	since	it	escalated	
in	 the	 beginning	 of	 2014.	 It	 argued	 Russia	 was	 needed	 for	 a	 political	 solution,	 but	
condemned	Russia’s	actions	 in	eastern	Ukraine	(Dutch	MFA	2014i).	The	crash	of	MH17	did	
not	 cause	 an	 increase	 in	 negative	 communiqués	 on	 Russia’s	 role	 in	 the	 Ukraine	 crisis	
immediately.	 Quite	 the	 contrary	 happened	 and	 after	 the	 crash	 both	 countries	 had	much	
contact	with	each	other	and	agreed	on	the	need	for	a	ceasefire	(Kremlin	2014c).	They	were	
not	 negative	 about	 each	 other.	 Probably	 the	 statements	 were	 positive	 between	 the	 two	
because	 cooperation	 was	 needed	 to	 satisfy	 the	 special	 interest	 of	 the	 Netherlands	 to	
repatriate	the	bodies	of	flight	MH17’s	casualties.	For	this	a	ceasefire	was	needed	around	the	
crash	site	in	eastern	Ukraine.	Russia	could	use	its	influence	on	the	forces	in	eastern	Ukraine	
to	 assure	 a	 ceasefire.	 Therefore,	 the	 Netherlands	 temporarily	 suspended	 its	 criticism	 of	
Russia’s	role	in	the	Ukraine	crisis.	
																																																								
6	More	recent	sources	are	used	to	explain	Russia’s	position	on	the	topic	when	it	did	not	mention	the	Netherlands	
in	relation	to	the	topic.	These	sources	are	not	included	in	the	data.		
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The	 positive	 communiqués	 by	 Russia	were	 in	 June	 and	 July	 2014,	 after	 the	MH17	
crash.	 Cooperation	 to	 solve	 the	 crisis	 in	 Ukraine	 was	 discussed	 together	 with	 the	
investigation	into	the	MH17	crash	(Kremlin	2014c).	Possibly	the	Russian	government	agreed	
on	 the	 need	 for	 a	 ceasefire,	 because	 it	 feared	 it	would	 be	 held	 responsible	 for	 the	 plane	
crash,	as	it	kept	emphasizing	the	importance	of	independent	investigation.		
	
Revelations	and	accusations			
The	Dutch	 government	 sometimes	 stated	 cooperation	was	 needed	 to	 solve	 the	 crisis,	 but	
overall	 it	 was	 critical	 of	 Russia’s	 role	 in	 the	 crisis.	 The	 Dutch	 government	 became	 more	
critical,	 and	 talked	about	Russia’s	 involvement	more	often,	when	 the	Russian	president	 in	
March	2015	said	Russia	had	made	plans	for	Crimea’s	incorporation	on	22	February	2014	and	
Russian	troops	were	 involved	(BBC	2015).	This	was	weeks	before	the	disputed	referendum	
on	 separation	 from	 Ukraine	 was	 held.	 The	 revelation	made	 the	 Dutch	more	 confident	 to	
openly	state	its	suspicions.		
In	 the	 letter	 of	 13	May	 2015	 the	 Dutch	MFA	 for	 the	 first	 time	 openly	 expressed	
Russia	played	a	central	role	in	the	creation	of	the	conflict	 in	eastern	Ukraine.	 It	said	Russia	
maintained	 the	 conflict	 by	 actively	 supporting	 the	 separatists	 with	 weapons,	 military	
personnel,	 financial	 and	political	 support	 (Dutch	MFA	2015c,	 5).	 It	went	 beyond	 suspicion	
and	the	Dutch	government	accused	Russia	of	direct	involvement.	The	Dutch	MFA	said	it	was	
no	longer	possible	to	maintain	the	same	good	relations	with	Russia	as	before	its	interference	
in	Ukraine	 (Dutch	MFA	2015c).	These	are	 serious	 statements	 that	 show	a	deterioration	of	
the	relations.	It	is	likely	the	Netherlands,	with	the	Russian	president’s	confession,	felt	secure	
enough	to	also	point	to	Russia’s	actions	in	eastern	Ukraine.		
	 However,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 the	 Dutch	 government	 emphasized	 other	 actors	
condemned	Russian	 actions	 as	well.	 So	 did	 the	Dutch	MFA	write	 that	 Russia	 continuously	
undertook	 provocative	 actions	 in	 eastern	 Ukraine,	 such	 as	 providing	 the	 disputed	
‘humanitarian’	convoys	without	permission	of	Ukraine	(Dutch	MFA	2015f).	The	Netherlands	
together	with	the	EU	condemned	these	actions	and	urged	Russia	to	use	its	influence	among	
the	 separatists	 to	 adhere	 to	 the	 Minsk	 (II)	 Agreements.	 A	 possible	 explanation	 why	 the	
Netherlands	 stressed	 others	 have	 condemned	 Russian	 actions	 as	 well,	 can	 be	 that	 the	
Netherlands	 tried	 to	 minimize	 the	 retaliatory	 damage	 of	 these	 statements	 and	 create	
credibility	for	its	statements.	
Furthermore,	 in	 May	 2015	 the	 Dutch	 government	 mentioned	 that	 a	 rift	
(“waterscheiding”)	between	Russia	and	the	Netherlands	had	developed.	The	Dutch	minister	
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of	 foreign	 affairs	 said	 2014	 was	 the	 changing	 point	 (Dutch	 MFA	 2015).	 He	 argued	 the	
‘annexation’	of	Crimea	and	military	involvement	in	eastern	Ukraine	showed	that	Russia	did	
not	 recoil	 from	 violating	 the	 international	 rule	 of	 law	 (Dutch	MFA	 2015r).	 This	 is	 another	
example	of	the	Netherlands	being	more	critical	in	2015	of	Russia’s	actions	in	Ukraine.	
	
Conclusion	
Thus,	the	Netherlands	was	critical	of	Russia’s	role	in	Ukraine	from	the	moment	Crimea	was	
incorporated,	 which	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 general	 trend.	 For	 a	 brief	 moment	 it	 paused	 its	
criticism	when	cooperation	was	needed	to	repatriate	bodies	and	recover	plane	fragments	of	
flight	MH17.	However,	 the	Netherlands	became	more	critical	after	 the	Russian	president’s	
statement	 that	 the	 plan	 to	 incorporate	 Crimea	 was	 made	 weeks	 before	 the	 disputed	
referendum.	From	that	moment	on,	the	Netherlands	felt	secure	enough	to	accuse	Russia	of	
involvement	in	eastern	Ukraine.		
Russia	 published	 most	 of	 its	 positive	 communiqués	 in	 the	 short	 period	 after	 the	
crash.	 It	declared	 its	desire	to	have	peace	 in	eastern	Ukraine	to	the	Netherlands,	probably	
because	 it	 feared	 it	 would	 be	 held	 responsible	 for	 the	 conflict	 in	 eastern	 Ukraine	 and	
therefore	 indirectly	 for	 the	 downing	 of	MH17.	 The	 anger	 of	 the	 international	 community	
would	 have	been	worse	 if	 Russia	 had	 actively	 obstructed	a	 cease-fire	 on	 the	 crash-site	 or	
had	refrained	from	contributing	to	it.	Russia	presumably	knew	anger	over	MH17	could	(and	
did)	cause	the	European	countries	to	unite	in	responding	to	Russia’s	involvement	in	Ukraine.	
The	downing	of	MH17	created	unity	 in	 the	EU	to	 impose	sanctions.	EU	countries	could	no	
longer	 ignore	 the	 conflict	 and	 oppose	 sanctions	 now	 EU	 citizens	 had	 fallen	 victim	 in	 the	
conflict.		
	
5.3	Crimea’s	incorporation	
The	 topic	 ‘Crimea’s	 incorporation’	 concerns	 the	 incorporation7	of	 Crimea	 by	 Russia.	 The	
subject	‘Crimea’s	incorporation’	is	separate	because	the	incorporation	in	March	2014	was	a	
big	event	 in	the	relations	between	the	two	countries	and	the	manner	 in	which	they	talked	
about	 each	 other	 on	 the	 subject	 developed	 separately	 from	 the	 Ukraine	 crisis.	 On	 27	
February	2014	unknown	troops	without	insignias	appeared	in	Crimea.	While	initially	unclear,	
later	the	Russian	government	confirmed	these	were	Russian	troops.	Two	weeks	later,	on	16	
March,	 there	was	 a	 disputed	 referendum	on	 separation	 from	Ukraine	 in	which	 a	majority	
voted	to	separate.	Two	days	later	Crimea	announced	its	independence	and	joined	Russia.																																																										
7	Incorporation	is	used	as	a	neutral	term.	It	is	not	the	aim	of	this	study	to	judge	who	is	right	or	not.		
	 24	
	
Figure	5:	Communiqués	regarding	Crimea’s	incorporation	
Year	 Percentage	of	
communiqués	in	which	
discussed	
Average	value	
2013	 -	 -	
2014	 21%	 -1	
2015	 8%	 -1	
	
Crimea	was	discussed	in	21%	of	the	communiqués	in	2014,	with	an	average	negative	
score	of	 -1,	presented	 in	 figure	5.	Only	 the	Netherlands	discussed	Russia	 in	 the	context	of	
Crimea.	Russia	did	not	discuss	the	Netherlands	in	connection	to	Crimea’s	incorporation.		
	
The	return	of	Crimea	
Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Russia	 did	 not	 raise	 the	 Netherlands	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Crimea,	 it	 is	
useful	to	briefly	discuss	Russia’s	position	on	Crimea,	in	order	to	see	how	it	differed	from	that	
of	 the	Netherlands.	 Russia	 viewed	 Crimea	 as	 its	 little	 brother,	 an	 intrinsic	 part	 of	 greater	
Russia,	 and	 its	 incorporation	 was	 seen	 as	 the	 “return”	 of	 Crimea	 (Putin	 2014a).	 Initially,	
Russia	denied	planning	the	incorporation	(ibid.).	A	year	later	the	Russian	president	said	the	
plan	to	incorporate,	or	“return”,	Crimea	was	made	days	before	forces	were	send	there	and	
weeks	before	the	disputed	referendum	(BBC	2015).		
Russia	saw	the	referendum	to	separate	from	Ukraine	as	legitimate	and	democratic.	
The	Russian	ambassador	to	the	EU,	Chizhov,	said	it	had	no	choice	but	to	accept	that	Crimea	
“chose	 freely”	 to	 join	 Russia	 (Chizhov	 2014).	 Russia	 argued	 Crimea	 freely	 chose	 to	 leave	
Ukraine	because	the	Russian	population	was	under	threat	of	the	new	Ukrainian	government.	
The	 Russian	 foreign	 minister	 said	 the	 “freely	 expressed	 will	 of	 the	 people	 of	 Crimea”	 to	
separate	 from	 Ukraine	 and	 join	 Russia	 was	 a	 response	 to	 the	 anti-Russian	 policy	 of	
“ultranationalists”	(Lavrov	2015b).		
	
Tacit	condemnation	
There	 are	 two	 stages	 in	 how	 the	Dutch	 government	 assessed	Russia’s	 role	 in	 Crimea.	 The	
Netherlands	was	quick	to	condemn	Russia’s	“actions”	in	Crimea	and	called	the	incorporation	
an	 ‘illegal	 annexation’	 tacitly	 through	 the	 EU.	 However,	 it	 took	 three	 months	 before	 the	
Netherlands	called	it	an	“illegal	annexation”	(“illegale	annexatie”)	in	its	communiqués.		
The	first	stage	was	condemning	Russia’s	use	of	forces	and	agreeing	through	the	EU	
to	call	it	an	‘illegal	annexation’.	On	2	March	2014	the	Netherlands	was	critical	of	Russia’s	role	
in	 Ukraine	 and	 condemned	 Russia’s	 use	 of	 forces	 in	 Crimea	 (Dutch	 MFA	 2014e).	 The	
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Netherlands	 reminded	 Russia,	 that	 Russia	 itself	 often	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	
international	 law,	 sovereignty	 and	 international	 organizations	 (ibid.).	 The	 Dutch	MFA	 saw	
Russia’s	 actions	 in	 Ukraine	 as	 unacceptable,	 but	 still	 believed	 dialogue	 with	 Russia	 was	
needed	for	a	solution	(ibid.).	On	7	March	2014	the	Dutch	prime	minister	called	the	situation	
in	 Crimea	 extraordinarily	 precarious	 (Dutch	Ministry	 of	 General	 Affairs	 2014f).	 He	 still	 did	
not	call	it	an	annexation	and	illegal.	However,	when	journalists	used	“annexation	of	Crimea”	
in	 their	 questions	 he	 did	 not	 dispute	 this	 phrasing	 (ibid.).	 It	 suggests	 he	 at	 least	 did	 not	
oppose	 the	 term.	 This	 was	 days	 after	 Russian	 troops	 had	 entered	 Crimea.	 The	 Dutch	
government	had	a	reason	not	to	call	it	an	‘annexation’	at	that	time,	because	Crimea	had	not	
yet	joined	the	Russian	territory	and	the	troops	had	only	entered	it.	Technically	 it	could	not	
be	called	an	‘annexation’	yet.	The	first	time	it	was	tacitly	called	an	“illegal	annexation”	is	in	
the	 common	 report	 of	 the	 European	 Foreign	 Affairs	 Council	 of	 20	March	 2014	 (European	
Council	2014).8	This	is	still	a	shared	report	of	the	entire	EU	and	the	Dutch	individual	position	
is	not	mentioned,	even	though	it	agreed	by	tacit	consent.		
On	18	March	the	Dutch	minister	of	foreign	affairs	wrote	on	his	social	media	that	the	
incorporation	was	an	“illegal	annexation”.	This	made	it	 into	several	news	articles,	which	all	
referred	 to	 his	 social	 media	 statement	 (Reformatorisch	 Dagblad	 2014;	 BNR	 2014).	 The	
statement	 was	 not	 published	 officially.9	The	 first	 time	 it	 was	 mentioned	 in	 government	
communiqués	was	on	12	 June	2014.	Thus,	 the	Dutch	minister	made	a	personal	 statement	
that	did	not	reflect	the	Dutch	government’s	official	opinion	at	the	time.	
	
Cautious	explicit	Dutch	condemnation		
In	 a	 letter	 of	 12	 June	 2014,	 the	 Dutch	 MFA	 for	 the	 first	 time	 explicitly	 called	 the	
incorporation	of	Crimea	an	‘illegal	annexation’	by	Russia	(Dutch	MFA	2014f).	This	presented	
the	second	stage	in	assessing	the	incorporation.	Furthermore,	the	Dutch	MFA	said	Russia’s	
attitude	towards	Ukraine	was	unacceptable	(“onaanvaardbaar”)	(ibid.).	Calling	one’s	actions	
unacceptable	and	illegal	is	not	a	light	measure	and	it	signified	a	deterioration	in	the	Russian-
Dutch	relations.	The	reason	why	the	Dutch	MFA	said	it	at	that	moment	is	not	clear.	Possibly	
it	 said	 so	 because	many	 other	 governments	 had	 done	 so	 explicitly	 already.	 Furthermore,	
more	accounts	appeared	that	Russia	did	not	do	its	best	to	de-escalate	the	conflict	and	hence	
European	countries	and	the	Netherlands	had	become	more	agitated.																																																										
8	In	the	annotated	agenda	of	the	EU	Foreign	Affairs	Council	the	Dutch	position	is	given.	Therefore	the	annotated	
agendas	are	used	for	the	research,	and	not	the	account	of	the	meetings.	
9	It	would	be	 interesting	 to	examine	how	officials	use	 their	 social	media	and	personal	websites.	However,	 this	
study	examines	 the	official	 statements	and	 therefore	does	not	examine	social	media	or	personal	websites	any	
further.	This	example	shows	there	can	be	a	difference	in	official	statements	and	statements	on	personal	account.		
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	 After	the	downing	of	MH17	in	July,	Crimea’s	incorporation	was	discussed	in	only	one	
communiqué	 in	 2014.	 In	 it,	 the	 Dutch	 MFA	 said	 the	 “illegal	 annexation”	 and	 lack	 of	
deescalating	measures	had	caused	a	rift	in	the	relations	with	Russia	(Dutch	MFA	2014b).	The	
Netherlands	thus	hardly	discussed	Crimea	in	the	second	half	of	2014.	However,	the	one	time	
it	 did,	 it	was	negative	 and	 indicated	 it	was	 the	 cause	of	 a	 rift	 in	 relations.	An	explanation	
could	be	that	the	Netherlands	did	not	discuss	it	much	because	it	wanted	Russia	to	cooperate	
on	peace	and	this	way	ensure	bringing	back	the	bodies	of	the	MH17	crash	and	parts	of	the	
plane	for	analysis.	Limiting	the	statements	on	sensitive	issues	made	cooperation	more	likely.	
That	the	Dutch	government	said	it	caused	a	rift,	however,	shows	Crimea’s	incorporation	was	
important	for	the	government.		
In	2015	the	Dutch	government	continued	to	condemn	the	incorporation	of	Crimea,	
however,	 no	 new	 developments	 in	 how	 both	 countries	 discussed	 each	 other	 occurred.	 In	
figure	5	 it	 can	be	observed	Crimea’s	 incorporation	was	discussed	 less	 in	2015,	because	as	
time	passed	other	 issues	became	more	 important.	One	 remarkable	 finding	 in	2015	 is	 that	
the	Dutch	prime	minister	for	the	first	(and	only)	time	called	it	an	“illegal	annexation”	on	29	
May	2015	 (Dutch	Ministry	of	General	Affairs	2015c).	He	called	 it	an	“illegal	annexation”	 in	
response	to	a	question	about	three	Dutch	parliamentarians	being	put	on	a	no-entry	 list	by	
Russia.	 Possibly	 it	 was	 a	 slip	 of	 the	 tongue	 in	 his	 agitation	 when	 discussing	 the	 incident.	
Probably	 he	 did	 not	 call	 it	 so	 on	 other	 occasions	 because	 it	 is	 not	 protocol	 for	 a	 prime	
minister	 to	 give	 such	 an	 assessment	 on	 another	 country.	 There	 is	 one	 previous	 instance	
when	the	Ministry	of	General	Affairs	quoted	him	to	have	said	so,	but	this	was	a	translation	
error.10	
The	 Dutch	 MFA	 often	 emphasized	 the	 international	 community	 called	 it	 the	
“Crimean	 annexation”	 as	 well	 (Dutch	 MFA	 2015c,	 5).	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 Netherlands	
highlights	that	 it	was	not	the	only	one	to	do	so.	Possibly	this	was	done	to	bring	a	stronger	
case	and	prevent	retaliatory	actions.	
	
Conclusion	
The	 Netherlands	 and	 Russia	 differed	 in	 opinion	 regarding	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 Crimea’s	
incorporation	and	the	involvement	of	Russia	in	the	process.	Russia	saw	the	incorporation	as	
“the	 return	 of	 Crimea”,	while	 the	Netherlands	 eventually	 called	 it	 an	 “illegal	 annexation”.																																																									
10	In	 the	Dutch	 translation	of	his	English	speech	 it	 is	 said	 ‘without	 the	conflict	around	 the	 illegal	annexation	of	
Crimea	and	the	destabilization	of	eastern	Ukraine…’	(“Zonder	het	conflict	rond	de	annexatie	van	de	Krim	en	de	
destabilisatie	 van	Oost-Oekraïne...”)	 the	passengers	of	MH17	would	 still	 have	 lived	 (Dutch	Ministry	of	General	
Affairs	 2014g).	 However,	 in	 the	 actual	 English	 speech	 he	 said	 they	would	 still	 be	 alive	 “if	 not	 for	 the	 Crimea	
conflict…”	(Dutch	Ministry	of	General	Affairs	2014h;	UN	2014).		
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The	Netherlands	early	on	condemned	the	Russian	“annexation	of	Crimea”	by	tacit	consent	in	
common	EU-condemnation.	It	did	so	explicitly	a	few	months	later	in	June	2014.	However,	it	
was	cautious	 in	using	the	words	“illegal	annexation”	 in	the	second	half	of	2014.	Possibly	 it	
did	so	 for	 the	same	reason	as	 it	 suspended	 its	criticism	on	the	Ukraine	crisis,	as	 it	wanted	
Russia	 to	cooperate	on	 the	MH17	repatriation	and	 investigation.	The	Netherlands	was	not	
cautious	in	the	words	it	used	as	it	continued	to	call	the	incorporation	an	“illegal	annexation”,	
but	 it	was	 cautious	 in	 how	often	 it	 said	 so.	Additionally,	 it	 shows	MH17	was	not	 the	only	
event	that	had	a	significant	influence	on	how	the	Netherlands	talked	about	Russia,	since	the	
statements	 concerning	Crimea’s	 incorporation	became	more	negative	 a	month	before	 the	
downing	happened.	
	
5.4	Shared	neighbourhood		
The	 issue	 of	 the	 ‘shared	 neighbourhood’11	involves	 the	 shared	 EU-Russia	 neighbours.	 It	
analyses	 how	both	 countries	 communicate	 on	 each	 other’s	 role	 there.	 It	 is	 not	 about	 the	
role	 in	a	specific	country,	such	as	Ukraine,	but	 in	the	region	as	a	whole.	The	topic	 includes	
how	 NATO’s	 role	 in	 the	 region	 is	 discussed,	 because	 this	 was	 often	 raised	 in	 the	
communiqués.	 Figure	 6	 shows	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 Russia	 discussed	 the	 shared	
neighbourhood	in	relation	to	the	other	country	in	only	4%	of	the	communiqués	in	2013,	in	a	
negative	manner.	In	2014	and	2015	the	issue	became	more	important	and	was	raised	in	21%	
and	 23%	 of	 the	 communiqués,	 respectively.	 In	 both	 2014	 and	 2015	 the	 shared	
neighbourhood	was	discussed	negatively	with	an	average	value	close	to	-1.		
	
Figure	6:	Communiqués	regarding	the	shared	neighbourhood	
Year	 Percentage	of	
communiqués	in	which	
discussed	
Average	value	
2013	 4%	 -0.5	
2014	 21%	 -0.73	
2015	 23%	 -0.93	
	
Only	 the	 Netherlands	 discussed	 the	 other	 country	 (Russia)	 regarding	 the	 ‘shared	
neighbourhood’	 in	 these	 three	 years.	 Russia	 talked	 about	 its	 neighbours,	 but	 did	 not	
mention	 the	 Netherlands	 in	 its	 communiqués.	 This	 is	 probably	 because	 Russia	 did	 not	
believe	 the	 Netherlands	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 shared	 neighbourhood.	 For	 the	
Netherlands,	 Russia	 was	 an	 important	 player	 in	 the	 shared	 neighbourhood.	 Hence,	 this																																																									
11	The	term	‘shared	neighbourhood’	is	used	to	designate	the	common	EU-Russia	neighbours	as	a	whole,	and	not	
the	individual	countries	or	the	‘European	Neighbourhood’	that	includes	the	EU’s	southern	neighbours	as	well.		
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section	discusses	how	the	attitude	of	 the	Dutch	government	 regarding	Russia’s	 role	 in	 the	
shared	 neighbourhood	 developed.	 However,	 in	 order	 to	 see	 how	 the	Dutch	 view	 differed	
from	the	Russian	view,	the	Russian	position	is	briefly	examined.	
	
The	Russian	view12	
The	 Russian	 government	 argued	 it	 wanted	 to	 cooperate	 with	 the	 EU.	 The	 Russian	
ambassador	to	the	EU	Chizhov	argued,	Russia	wanted	equal	and	shared	responsibility	of	the	
shared	neighbourhood	 (Chizhov	 2015b).	 Russia	 has	 outlined	 the	position	 that	 the	Ukraine	
crisis	 and	 poor	 Russia-EU	 relations	 were	 caused	 by	 the	 EU’s	 unwillingness	 to	 share	 this	
responsibility.	The	Russian	government	said	 the	“unilateral	EaP	policy”	did	not	 include	 the	
Russian	interests	and	largely	provoked	the	Ukraine	crisis	(Russian	Mission	to	the	EU	2016a).	
Chizhov	even	argued	the	EaP	was	a	soft-power	substitute	for	NATO	expansion	 in	the	post-
Soviet	space	(Chizhov	2015b).	Furthermore,	he	argued	the	EU’s	“imposing”	of	democracy	in	
the	 region	 contributed	 to	 the	 instability	 (ibid.).	 Thus,	 the	Russian	government	had	quite	 a	
negative	view	of	the	EU’s	role	 in	the	shared	neighbourhood.	However,	 in	bilateral	Russian-
Dutch	relations	these	statements	were	not	made	in	the	public	communiqués.		
	
A	more	assertive	Russia,	but	a	partnership	is	needed	
In	the	end	of	2013	the	Dutch	MFA	noted	Russia	became	a	more	assertive	geopolitical	player	
in	 the	world	 (Dutch	MFA	 2013d,	 3).	 It	 argued	 that	 despite	 positive	 fields	 of	 cooperation,	
there	was	 not	 enough	mutual	 trust,	mainly	 because	of	NATO-Russia	 relations	 (ibid.,	 5).	 In	
January	2014	both	the	EU	and	the	Netherlands	were	critical	of	Russia’s	attitude	towards	the	
countries	 of	 the	 Eastern	 Partnership.	 However,	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 were	 still	
seeking	 a	 new	 strategic	 partnership	 with	 Russia	 and	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	 good	
relations	(Dutch	MFA	2014j).		
Two	months	after	Crimea’s	 incorporation,	the	Netherlands	was	only	slightly	critical	
of	Russia’s	actions	 in	 the	shared	neighbourhood	and	still	wanted	to	build	a	partnership.	 In	
May	2014	the	Dutch	prime	minister	said	he	understood	the	worries	of	the	Baltic	States,	but	
he	did	not	believe	Russia	posed	a	real	threat	to	the	Baltics	(Dutch	Ministry	of	General	Affairs	
2014d).	Nonetheless,	the	Netherlands	sent	extra	forces	to	the	Baltics	as	an	additional	NATO	
contribution,	to	reassure	the	eastern	NATO	partners	(ibid.).	In	other	words,	the	Dutch	prime	
minister	believed	the	Baltics	and	the	shared	neighbourhood	wrongfully	perceived	Russia	as	a	
																																																								
12	The	statements	in	this	paragraph	are	not	included	in	the	database,	because	they	are	not	Russian	statements	
on	the	Netherlands	in	specific	and	hence	not	the	focus	of	this	study.		
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threat.	The	extra	forces	were	sent	to	acknowledge	their	concerns	and	improve	the	relations	
with	these	countries.		
In	 June	2014	 the	Netherlands	condemned	 improper	 (“oneigenlijke”)	pressure	 from	
Russia	on	the	shared	neighbours	of	Moldova,	Ukraine	and	Georgia	(Dutch	MFA	2014f).	The	
Dutch	government	rejected	the	existence	of	dividing	lines,	where	some	countries	belong	to	
one	 sphere	 of	 influence	 or	 the	 other	 (ibid.).	 The	 Dutch	 government	 in	 the	 same	
communiqué	 recognized	 that	 Russia	 played	 a	 part	 in	 the	 shared	 neighbourhood	 and	 said	
that	 Russia	 is	 and	 will	 remain	 a	 strategic	 partner	 of	 the	 EU	 (ibid.).	 Thus,	 after	 the	
incorporation	 of	 Crimea	 in	 March	 2014	 the	 Netherlands	 became	 slightly	 more	 critical	 of	
Russia’s	role	in	the	shared	neighbourhood,	but	nevertheless	encouraged	the	partnership.	
	
Russian	perceived	concerns		
The	 research	 shows	 the	Netherlands	 discussed	 Russia’s	 role	 in	 the	 shared	 neighbourhood	
more	negatively	in	the	months	after	the	downing	of	MH17.	So	did	they	in	September	2014	
describe	Russia	as	a	 threat	 to	 the	shared	neighbourhood	and	 its	own	security	 (Dutch	MFA	
2014h).	Thus,	after	the	incorporation	of	Crimea	the	Dutch	government	was	more	critical	of	
Russia’s	role	in	the	shared	neighbourhood,	but	still	wanted	to	build	a	strategic	partnership.	
After	 the	 downing	 of	 MH17	 in	 July	 it	 became	more	 critical	 and	 did	 not	 want	 a	 strategic	
partnership	any	longer.	
	In	2015,	 the	Dutch	government	maintained	 its	negative	 stance	on	Russia’s	 role	 in	
the	 shared	neighbourhood.	 It	was	 the	 second	most	discussed	 topic	of	2015,	mentioned	 in	
23%	of	 the	 communiqués.	 In	May	 2015,	 the	Netherlands	 said	 the	 security	 dimension	 had	
become	 more	 important	 in	 Russian-Dutch	 relations,	 because	 Russia	 had	 become	 more	
assertive	and	aggressive	to	its	‘near	abroad’	(Dutch	MFA	2015c,	4).	It	saw	Russia	as	a	threat	
to	the	stability	of	the	European	security	architecture,	and	thus	its	own	(ibid.,	8).	
Consistent	 with	 the	 increasing	 importance	 of	 security,	 the	 Netherlands	 was	more	
outspoken	against	Russia’s	 ‘perception’	of	EU	and	NATO	expansion	as	a	threat.	Russia	saw	
the	NATO	and	EU	expansion	towards	its	borders	as	a	threat	and	leading	to	new	dividing	lines	
in	Europe	 (Russian	MFA	2016,	par.	61,	70).	The	Dutch	MFA	argued	that	Russia’s	perceived	
threat	 was	 incorrect	 (Dutch	MFA	 2015c,	 12).	 It	 argued,	 Russia	 had	 no	 right	 to	 dominate	
other	sovereign	countries	and	decide	which	organisations	these	countries	are	part	of	(ibid.).	
Furthermore,	 in	March	 2015	 the	Dutch	minister	 of	 foreign	 affairs	 said	Dutch	people	were	
rightfully	 concerned	 about	 Russia	 (Dutch	 MFA	 2015L).	 The	 Dutch	 MFA	 argued	 that	 the	
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destabilizing	 actions	 of	 Russia	 in	 Ukraine	 and	 its	 assertive	 attitude	 had	 impact	 on	 the	
territorial	security	of	the	Netherlands	and	its	NATO	allies	(Dutch	MFA	2015h).		
Together	with	this	shift	in	opinion,	another	broader	development	can	be	observed.	
A	shift	occurred	from	a	Russia-first	policy	 in	the	region,	towards	a	policy	that	favoured	the	
countries	of	the	shared	neighbourhood.	The	Dutch	foreign	minister	argued,	that	the	EaP	was	
more	 important	 than	 ever,	 because	 of	 Russia’s	 incorporation	 of	 Crimea	 and	 its	 role	 in	
eastern	 Ukraine	 (Dutch	 MFA	 2015m).	 However,	 he	 also	 emphasised	 closer	 cooperation	
between	the	EU	and	countries	of	the	EaP	should	not	be	seen	as	a	choice	against	Russia.	
	
Finding	the	balance	between	deterrence	and	dialogue	
In	 2015	 the	discussion	on	 the	 shared	neighbourhood	 revolved	 around	 finding	 the	balance	
between	deterrence	and	dialogue.	However,	the	communications	focus	more	on	deterrence	
against	Russia	than	dialogue	with	it.	
In	February	2015,	the	Dutch	minister	of	foreign	affairs	said	safety	guarantees	were	
needed	for	Baltic	NATO	allies	because	of	Russian	provocations	(Dutch	MFA	2015k).	The	need	
for	these	guarantees	increased	because	of	Russian	provocations,	such	as	air	space	violations	
and	 its	 actions	 in	 Ukraine.	 These	 reassurances	 acted	 as	 a	 deterrence	 against	 Russian	
aggression.	The	Dutch	MFA	argued	that	the	Russian	assertiveness	created	a	higher	priority	
for	collective	security	and	therefore	increased	military	strength	and	a	higher	military	budget	
were	needed	(Dutch	MFA	2015h).		
Because	the	Netherlands	considered	Russia	more	as	a	 threat,	 it	had	become	more	
active	in	the	shared	neighbourhood.	In	September	2015	the	Dutch	MFA	together	with	some	
other	EU	members	promoted	the	plan	to	strengthen	 independent	Russian-language	media	
in	eastern	Europe,	which	was	 later	 implemented	(Dutch	MFA	2015g).	 It	shows	the	EU,	and	
the	 Netherlands	 as	 one	 of	 the	 initiators,	 had	 become	 more	 active	 in	 the	 shared	
neighbourhood,	 to	 counter	 the	 Russian	 state’s	 ‘disinformation’	 in	 these	 countries.	
Additionally,	 the	Netherlands	had	sent	more	military	 troops	 to	eastern	Europe	to	reassure	
the	eastern	NATO	allies	(Dutch	MFA	2015h).		
	 However,	 in	 addition	 to	 deterrence,	 the	 Dutch	 government	 believed	 there	 should	
also	be	dialogue.	 It	argued	 the	NATO-Russia	Council	should	meet	again	to	prevent	military	
incidents	 from	 happening	 (Dutch	 MFA	 2015L).	 In	 December	 2015	 the	 Netherlands	
emphasized	 cooperation	 with	 Russia	 was	 needed	 on	 several	 issues,	 such	 as	 non-
proliferation,	 the	 fight	 against	 terrorism,	 and	 reaching	 a	 peaceful	 solution	 in	 Syria	 (Dutch	
MFA	2015i).	The	Dutch	government	paid	special	attention	to	deterrence	because	of	Russia’s	
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increasing	 assertiveness.	 Probably	 it	 also	 mentioned	 dialogue	 because	 it	 did	 not	 want	 to	
completely	 break	 relations.	 By	 compartmentalizing	 the	 relations,	 the	 good	 cooperation	 in	
some	areas	prevented	the	rift	in	relations	from	worsening.	Russia	and	the	Netherlands	were	
still	cooperating	on	some	issues	and	still	trying	to	salvage	what	was	left	of	their	relations.		
	
Conclusion	
The	shared	neighbourhood	was	barely	discussed	in	2013.	The	Netherlands	discussed	it	more	
since	 the	 incorporation	of	 Crimea	 in	March	2014.	 In	 2014	 and	2015	 statements	 regarding	
Russia	 were	 negative,	 with	 the	 downing	 of	 MH17	 as	 the	 turning	 point.	 Contrary	 to	 the	
general	 trend,	 the	 communiqués	 did	 not	 become	 more	 negative	 after	 Crimea’s	
incorporation.	 A	 change	 occurred	 in	 who’s	 concerns	 were	 considered	 ‘perceived’.		
‘Perceived’	indicating	that	the	Netherlands	did	not	see	them	as	legitimate.	First	the	concerns	
of	 Russian	 aggression	 in	 some	 countries	 of	 the	 shared	 neighbourhood	 were	 labelled	
‘perceived’	by	the	Dutch	government.	After	the	MH17	crash	these	concerns	were	seen	as	a	
rightful	 threat	 and	 Russia’s	 concerns	 of	 NATO	 and	 EU	 encroachment	 were	 labelled	
‘perceived’.	This	change	 in	opinion,	of	which	concerns	were	considered	 ‘perceived’,	 shows	
the	Netherlands	was	 no	 longer	 eager	 to	 appease	 Russia	 at	 all	 costs.	 It	 presents	 a	 shift	 in	
preference	from	Russia	towards	the	countries	of	the	shared	neighbourhood.	Because	Russia	
was	now	seen	as	a	threat	there	was	a	focus	on	creating	deterrence	against	possible	Russian	
aggression	in	the	shared	neighbourhood.	
	
5.5	Diplomatic	incidents	
Incidents	are	not	registered	as	one	issue	because	they	are	temporary,	not	reoccurring	over	
the	years	and	each	was	discussed	separately.	Hence,	incidents	each	have	their	separate	label	
in	 the	 research.	 They	 are	 included	 in	 ‘security’	 because	 the	 most	 discussed	 incidents	
revolved	 around	 security	 issues	 of	 nationals	 abroad.	 The	 main	 incidents	 were	 the	 Arctic	
Sunrise,	 the	 Russian	 diplomat	 arrest	 and	 the	Dutch	 diplomat	 assault.13	Here	 each	 incident	
represents	a	sub-chapter,	unlike	the	other	chapters	where	it	is	structured	by	development.	
This	is	done	because	the	manner	in	which	both	countries	talked	about	each	other	developed	
differently	on	each	incident.		
	
																																																									
13	A	couple	of	other	incidents	that	happened,	but	are	not	included	here,	are:	the	suicide	of	the	Russian	Dolmatov	
in	 a	 Dutch	 detention	 centre,	 the	 Crimean	 gold	 incident,	 extradition	 of	 Drinkman	 to	 the	 US,	 protestors	 in	 the	
Netherlands	during	official	visits,	and	other	miscellaneous	incidents.		
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Mutually	negative	on	the	Arctic	Sunrise	
The	 Arctic	 Sunrise	was	 a	 remarkable	 incident	 in	 the	 Russian-Dutch	 relations,	 discussed	 in	
23%	of	the	communiqués	in	2013	with	an	average	score	of	-0.27.	Unlike	the	other	incidents,	
here	 both	 sides	were	 negative	 about	 each	 other.	 In	 September	 2013,	 Russia	 arrested	 the	
crew	 of	 the	 Greenpeace-ship	 the	 Arctic	 Sunrise	 whilst	 protesting	 against	 deep-water	 oil	
extraction	in	the	Arctic	on	charges	of	piracy	and	later	charged	them	with	vandalism.	The	ship	
sailed	under	the	Dutch	flag	and	had	two	Dutch	crewmembers.	
Russia	and	 the	Netherlands	both	 spoke	about	each	other	negatively	 regarding	 the	
incident.	The	Dutch	government	filed	an	arbitration	procedure	against	Russia	because	of	the	
arrest	 of	 the	 ship’s	 crew	 (Dutch	 MFA	 2013d,	 7).	 Russia	 on	 its	 turn	 did	 not	 accept	 the	
jurisdiction	 of	 the	 International	 Tribunal	 for	 the	 Law	of	 the	 Sea	 in	 this	 case	 (Russian	MFA	
2013c).	When	the	court	decided	upon	the	release	of	the	ship	and	its	crew,	Russia	failed	to	
comply.	However,	the	crew	was	released	shortly	after	on	a	general	amnesty.		
	 The	position	of	the	Dutch	prime	minster	on	the	incident	is	remarkable,	because	he	
refused	to	be	critical	of	Russia	in	a	Q&A.	He	said	Russia	and	the	Netherlands	were	in	conflict,	
as	 good	 friends	 sometimes	 have	 conflicts	 (Dutch	Ministry	 of	 General	 Affairs	 2013d).	 This	
statement	is	in	line	with	the	desire	of	the	Dutch	government	to	move	past	the	incidents	of	
2013.	 That	 the	 crew	 fell	 under	 this	 general	 amnesty	 most	 likely	 was	 no	 coincidence.	
Presumably	 it	was	a	way	 for	 the	Russian	government	 to	save	 face,	because	this	way	 it	did	
not	have	to	give	in	to	the	court’s	ruling	and	no	longer	was	under	pressure	from	the	foreign	
governments	to	release	them.	Maybe	the	governments	even	made	an	agreement	to	settle	it	
this	 way.	 It	 would	 explain	 the	 Dutch	 prime	 minister’s	 stance,	 to	 refuse	 to	 say	 anything	
critical	about	it.	The	two	‘friends’	both	got	what	they	wanted:	Russia	could	show	it	did	not	
listen	 to	what	 international	 courts	had	 to	 say	on	 its	 decisions	 and	 the	Netherlands	 got	 its	
citizens	freed.		
In	 2015	 it	 was	 discussed	 again	 as	 the	 Permanent	 Court	 of	 Arbitration	 ruled	 that	
Russia	had	breached	international	law	and	had	to	compensate	the	Netherlands	for	it.	Russia	
believed	 the	 court	 ruling	 had	 no	 jurisdiction	 and	 refused	 to	 pay	 damages	 (Russian	 MFA	
2015a).	 In	 response,	 the	 Netherlands	 said	 Russia’s	 reaction	 was	 disappointing	 (“onder	 de	
maat”)	(Dutch	MFA	2015p).	
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Anger	on	Russian	diplomat	arrest		
In	 September	 the	Dutch	police	 in	The	Hague	arrested	a	Russian	diplomat.	Russia	was	 livid	
about	the	event	because	it	 ignored	the	diplomatic	 immunity	of	the	diplomat	(Russian	MFA	
2013g).	The	arrest	of	the	Russian	diplomat	was	talked	about	in	17%	of	the	communiqués	in	
2013,	with	an	average	value	of	0.	
The	 Russian	 minister	 of	 foreign	 affairs	 said	 the	 treatment	 of	 the	 diplomat	 was	
unacceptable	 and	 a	 gross	 violation	 of	 diplomatic	 conventions	 (Russian	 MFA	 2013g).	 The	
Netherlands	acknowledged	it	had	breached	international	law	with	the	arrest	and	apologized	
for	it	(Dutch	Ministry	of	General	Affairs	2013a;	Russian	MFA	2013b).	The	initial	Russian	anger	
can	 be	 seen	 as	 part	 of	 Russia’s	 priority	 of	 protecting	 its	 compatriots	 and	 citizens	 abroad.	
Whenever	the	rights	or	safety	of	a	Russian	is	compromised	abroad,	the	Russian	government	
is	 quick	 and	 firm	 in	 its	 reaction.	An	escalation	of	 the	 incident	was	prevented	because	 the	
Dutch	government	was	fast	to	acknowledge	its	wrong	and	apologized.		
	
Discontent	on	Dutch	diplomat	assault	
A	week	after	the	incident	with	the	Russian	diplomat,	a	Dutch	diplomat	was	assaulted	in	his	
house	 in	 Moscow.	 The	 assault	 on	 the	 Dutch	 diplomat	 caused	 less	 of	 a	 rouse	 in	 the	
communiqués	with	it	being	discussed	in	6%	of	the	cases	in	2013,	with	a	value	of	0.33.	
The	Russian	MFA	stated	 its	regrets	regarding	the	 incident	and	promised	to	“use	all	
means	necessary”	 to	arrest	 the	perpetrators	 (Russian	MFA	2013a).	The	Dutch	government	
deemed	 it	 positive	 that	 the	 Russian	 minister	 of	 foreign	 affairs	 wanted	 a	 criminal	
investigation	 into	 the	 incident	 (Dutch	Ministry	of	General	Affairs	 2013c).	 The	Dutch	prime	
minister	said	he	understood	it	raised	questions	on	the	broader	Russian-Dutch	relations,	but	
emphasized	 relations	 were	 best	 served	 with	 constructive	 contacts	 (ibid.).	 This	 shows	 the	
Dutch	government	in	2013	was	not	critical	of	incidents	in	order	to	foster	friendly	relations.	
In	2015	the	incident	was	raised	again	and	this	time	the	Dutch	government	was	more	
critical.	The	Dutch	government	said	it	was	not	content	with	the	Russian	efforts	on	the	case.	
It	believed	it	had	not	used	all	its	abilities	to	identify	the	perpetrators	(Dutch	MFA	2015j).	This	
change	in	attitude	shows	the	Netherlands	was	no	longer	committed	to	move	past	incidents.	
It	reflects	a	negative	development	in	the	Russian-Dutch	relations	over	2013-2015.		
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Conclusion	
The	incident	of	the	Arctic	Sunrise	shows	Russia	did	not	like	to	be	dictated	to.	It	wanted	to	be	
a	 sovereign	 pole	 in	 a	 multi-polar	 world.	 Furthermore,	 the	 incident	 shows	 the	 Dutch	
government	was	pragmatic,	as	it	spoke	in	a	diplomatic	manner	to	come	to	the	desired	result	
of	 freeing	 the	 Arctic	 Sunrise’s	 crewmembers.	 The	 incidents	 of	 the	 Russian	 and	 Dutch	
diplomats	 reaffirm	 Russia’s	 priority	 to	 protect	 the	 rights	 of	 its	 citizens	 abroad.	 For	 the	
Netherlands	 it	was	also	 important,	but	the	Netherlands	had	a	different	tactic	and	was	 less	
openly	 critical	 of	 it.	 Finally,	 the	 incidents	 present	 relations	 in	 general	 had	 deteriorated	by	
2015,	as	the	Netherlands	in	2015	was	more	critical	on	the	incidents	of	2013.		
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6.	Economic	relations	
6.1	Trade		
The	issues	discussed	within	‘economic	relations’	are	trade,	energy	and	sanctions.	Trade	was	
mentioned	 often	 in	 the	 Russian-Dutch	 relations	 because	 both	 countries	 account	 for	 a	
substantial	 part	 of	 the	 other’s	 total	 trade.	 The	 Netherlands	 was	 the	 largest	 export	
destination	of	Russia.	In	2015,	trade	to	the	Netherlands	accounted	for	11.9%	of	the	Russian	
exports,	 including	 the	CIS	countries	 (GKS	2016).	However,	 for	 the	Netherlands	 the	Russian	
share	in	its	trade	was	less	significant.	Dutch	trade	to	Russia	accounted	for	1%	of	the	Dutch	
total	 exports	 and	 Russian	 trade	 to	 the	 Netherlands	 accounted	 for	 3.65%	 of	 Dutch	 total	
imports	in	2015	(Centraal	Bureau	voor	de	Statistiek	2016).	The	discussion	about	trade	does	
not	 include	energy	and	the	sanctions	because	they	were	discussed	 in	the	communiqués	as	
separate	issues.	Figure	7	shows	trade	was	discussed	positively	in	all	the	three	years.		
	
Figure	7:	Communiqués	regarding	trade		
Year	 Percentage	of	
communiqués	in	which	
discussed	
Average	value	
2013	 23%	 1	
2014	 4%	 1	
2015	 5%	 0.67	
	
Business	as	less	usual	
Trade	 was	 raised	 in	 23%	 of	 the	 communiqués	 of	 2013.	 In	 all	 of	 them	 it	 was	 discussed	
positively,	with	an	average	value	of	1.	In	the	communiqués	of	both	countries	the	importance	
of	each	other’s	trade	and	investments	were	praised	and	the	prospects	to	continuing	growth	
were	welcomed	(Kremlin	2013c;	Dutch	MFA	2013d).	Trade	has	this	positive	value	because	it	
is	mutually	beneficial.	As	figure	7	shows,	trade	was	discussed	in	a	relatively	high	percentage	
of	 communiqués	 in	 2013.	 At	 the	 time,	 the	 countries	 were	 still	 committed	 to	maintaining	
good	relations,	which	changed	in	2014.	
	 Trade	 was	 not	 a	 controversial	 issue,	 as	 both	 countries	 wanted	 their	 economy	 to	
grow.	However,	some	journalists	asked	the	Dutch	prime	minister	how	trade	influenced	the	
willingness	to	be	critical	on	Russia	(Dutch	Ministry	of	General	Affairs	2013e).	Following	the	
logic	 that	 if	 a	 country	 would	 be	 too	 critical	 of	 another	 country,	 the	 latter	 could	 impose	
restrictive	trade	measures	as	a	punishment	and	thereby	prevent	or	halt	criticism.	Journalists	
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were	 the	 only	 ones	 in	 the	 communications	 who	 raised	 the	 potential	 use	 of	 trade	 in	 this	
punitive	matter	(Dutch	Ministry	of	General	Affairs	2013e).	The	government	officials	denied	
trade	 played	 a	 role	 in	 other	 areas.	 According	 to	 the	 Dutch	 prime	minister,	 trade	 was	 no	
impediment	 to	 raising	 the	 human	 rights	 situation	 in	 Russia.	 He	 argued,	 because	 of	 good	
trade	relations	it	was	possible	to	change	the	human	rights	situation	(ibid.).		
Russia	and	the	Netherlands	still	spoke	positively	about	each	other	regarding	trade	in	
2014	 and	 2015,	 when	 relations	 overall	 had	 deteriorated.	 It	 was	 spoken	 of	 as	 something	
separate	from	the	sanctions	and	the	Dutch	government	emphasized	it	continued	to	support	
Dutch	companies	to	do	business	in	Russia	(Dutch	MFA	2015c,	12).	
	 Moreover,	 the	 Dutch	 government	 still	 talked	 positively	 about	 Russia	 when	 in	 the	
beginning	of	August	2015	Dutch	flowers	exported	to	Russia	were	being	destroyed.	According	
to	Russia	this	was	because	of	safety	concerns,	since	a	potentially	dangerous	bug	was	found	
in	them	(RT	2015).	The	Dutch	prime	minister	did	not	speak	out	against	Russia	on	the	issue	
(Dutch	Ministry	of	General	Affairs	2015a).	The	destruction	of	the	flowers	most	likely	had	to	
do	with	the	Dutch	desire	to	set	up	an	international	tribunal	to	prosecute	those	responsible	
for	the	downing	of	MH17.	Russia	ordered	the	destruction	of	Dutch	flowers	during	the	time	
the	 Netherlands	 tried	 to	 establish	 such	 a	 tribunal	 through	 the	 UN.	 As	 argued	 above,	 the	
attempt	 to	 establish	 a	 tribunal	 deteriorated	 bilateral	 relations,	 and	 the	 burning	 of	 Dutch	
flowers	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 retaliation	 for	 trying	 to	 establish	 the	 tribunal.	 The	 Dutch	 prime	
minister	stated	he	did	not	see	any	connection	between	the	destruction	of	Dutch	flowers	and	
the	attempt	of	the	Netherlands	to	create	a	tribunal	(ibid.).	However,	it	is	claimed	that	Russia	
bans	 products	 as	 a	 political	 instrument	 more	 often	 (Cenusa,	 et	 al.	 2014).	 Russia	 usually	
justifies	these	bans	under	the	guise	of	public	safety,	claiming	some	products	from	a	country	
are	a	danger	to	public	health.	It	 is	noteworthy	 the	Dutch	prime	minister	refused	discussing	
this	as	a	possibility.	 It	suggests	the	Netherlands	was	still	willing	to	cooperate	and	cultivate	
good	relations	regarding	trade.		
	
Conclusion	
The	discussion	regarding	trade	developed	differently	 from	all	other	topics,	since	Russia	and	
the	 Netherlands	 discussed	 trade	 between	 the	 two	 positively	 in	 all	 the	 years.	 That	 this	
always-positive	 subject	 was	 discussed	 less	 in	 2014	 and	 2015	 indicates	 relations	 had	
deteriorated,	even	though	the	statements	concerning	the	subject	had	not.	Thus,	it	was	still	
‘business	 as	 usual’,	 but	 less	 usual	 than	 before	 March	 2014.	 The	 continued	 positive	
communiqués	 regarding	 trade	 probably	 were	 because	 trade	 was	 still	 important	 for	 the	
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Netherlands,	 and	 protecting	 the	 Dutch	 business	 interests	 abroad	 is	 one	 of	 the	MFA’s	 key	
tasks.	 However,	 promoting	 economic	 interests	 and	 being	 critical	 can	 go	 together.	 A	 large	
trade	dependence	does	however,	create	a	vulnerability	in	dealing	with	another	country.	At	
what	point	are	political	interests	more	important	than	economic	interests,	in	the	case	these	
are	conflicting?	The	discussions	about	energy	and	sanctions	give	insight	into	this	question.	
	
6.2	Energy	
Energy	(gas	and	oil)	made	up	a	big	chunk	of	the	Russian	exports	to	the	Netherlands	(Dutch	
MFA	 2013d,	 7).	 Energy	 is	 of	 special	 importance	 for	 the	 relations	 because	 it	 is	 crucial	 for	
security	of	the	state	and	big	business	interests	are	involved.	Additionally,	a	“significant”	part	
of	Russian	oil	is	transported	through	Dutch	ports	(Kremlin	2013b).	In	2013	the	discussion	on	
energy	was	positive	with	an	average	score	of	1.33.	Figure	8	shows	the	statements	regarding	
energy	became	less	positive	in	2014	and	this	continued	in	2015.	
	
Figure	8:	Communiqués	regarding	energy		
Year	 Percentage	of	
communiqués	in	which	
discussed	
Average	value	
2013	 6%	 1.33	
2014	 11%	 0.17	
2015	 7%	 0	
	
Welcome	cooperation	
In	2013	both	sides	were	pleased	with	cooperation	 in	 the	energy	sector	and	welcomed	the	
possibility	 of	 growth	 (Kremlin	 2013b;	 Dutch	 MFA	 2013c).	 The	 Russian	 president	 said	 the	
Dutch	 company	Gasunie	 was	 an	 important	 partner	 in	 the	Nord	 Stream	 gas	 pipeline	 from	
Russia	 to	 Germany	 (Kremlin	 2013b),	which	 bypasses	 Ukraine	 and	 other	 eastern	 European	
countries	 and	 makes	 supply	 more	 reliable.	 He	 praised	 the	 “very	 positive	 and	business-
oriented	relations”	with	the	Dutch	company	Shell,	which	was	an	important	player	in	energy	
projects	in	Russia	(ibid.).	Thus,	in	2013	business	was	growing	and	relations	were	friendly.	In	
2014	this	changed	with	Russian	involvement	in	Ukraine.	
	
Departmental	discord	to	decrease	dependence		
The	 Dutch	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 wanted	 to	 decrease	 the	 EU’s	 gas	 dependency	 on	
Russia,	 because	 of	 Russia’s	 use	 of	 gas	 as	 a	 pressure	 tool	 (Dutch	MFA	 2014a).	 The	 Dutch	
minister	of	foreign	affairs	even	called	energy	the	biggest	strategic	vulnerability	of	the	EU	and	
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argued	the	Ukraine	crisis	showed	reducing	this	vulnerability	should	be	a	top-priority	(Dutch	
MFA	 2014h).	 However,	 the	 dependence	 works	 both	 ways,	 and	 one	 could	 argue	 Russia	 is	
dependent	on	the	EU	for	buying	its	oil	and	gas.	The	EU	was	and	still	 is	the	most	 important	
consumer	 of	 Russian	 gas.	 Therefore	 Russia	 called	 creating	 an	 uninterrupted	 supply	 to	 EU	
markets	 a	 priority	 (Russian	Mission	 to	 the	 EU	 2016b).	 Bypassing	 eastern	 Europe	with	 the	
Nord	 Stream	 would	 increase	 Russia’s	 ability	 to	 use	 it	 as	 a	 political	 tool	 in	 that	 region,	
because	its	gas	supply	and	relations	with	western	Europe	would	not	be	hurt	then.	
Not	all	statements	in	the	communiqués	were	negative	or	neutral.	 In	April	and	May	
2014	Russia	 send	 letters	 to	 EU	members	 notifying	 them	of	Ukraine’s	 gas	 debt.	 The	Dutch	
government	did	not	see	this	as	contributing	to	a	solution	of	the	current	problems	between	
Russia	and	Ukraine	 (Dutch	MFA	2014d).	However,	 it	appreciated	Russia	was	willing	 to	 talk	
about	stabilizing	the	economy	of	Ukraine	and	its	willingness	to	talk	on	the	gas	supply	(ibid.).	
In	 this	 communiqué	 there	was	nothing	on	 the	 subject	of	Russia’s	 role	 in	Ukraine,	because	
the	 different	 departments	 were	 not	 in	 agreement.	 This	 document	 was	 published	 by	 the	
Dutch	MFA,	but	written	by	the	Ministry	of	Economic	Affairs	in	cooperation	with	the	MFA.	It	
shows	 there	was	 a	 difference	 of	 opinion	 between	ministries	 of	 the	 same	 government	 on	
how	to	deal	with	Russia.		
The	year	2015	saw	a	mixture	of	positive	and	negative	communiqués	on	energy.	The	
Dutch	MFA	 continued	 to	 state	 its	 desire	 to	 decrease	 EU’s	 energy	 dependency	 on	 Russia,	
because	 Russia	 showed	 willingness	 to	 use	 it	 as	 a	 political	 instrument,	 as	 it	 did	 so	 in	 its	
relations	with	Ukraine	(Dutch	MFA	2015n).	At	the	same	time,	the	Dutch	government	argued	
energy	 was	 a	 constructive	 element	 in	 relations	 (Dutch	 MFA	 2015e).	 Again	 there	 was	 a	
difference	in	how	ministries	talked	about	approaching	Russia.	In	July	2015	the	state-owned	
Dutch	 company	 Gasunie	 made	 a	 deal	 (declaration	 of	 intent)	 with	 the	 Russian	 Gazprom	
(Dutch	 MFA	 2015a).	 This	 was	 contrary	 to	 the	 statements	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 Dutch	 MFA	 to	
diminish	dependence	on	a	 single	 supplier,	which	EU-wide	 is	Russia.	 The	Dutch	Ministry	of	
Economic	Affairs14	argued	it	did	not	act	against	the	EU’s	agreements,	since	the	Netherlands	
was	 not	 dependent	 on	 Russian	 gas	 and	 it	 tried	 to	 secure	 energy	 provision	 for	 the	 Dutch	
people	(Dutch	MFA	2015a).	While	it	was	true	the	Netherlands	was	not	dependent,	it	would	
raise	EU	dependence	on	Russia	even	further	and	went	against	the	statements	of	the	Dutch	
MFA	to	decrease	the	EU’s	dependence.	Possibly,	economic	growth	was	a	greater	motivator	
for	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Economic	 Affairs	 than	 reducing	 dependence	 on	 Russia,	 since	 the	
Netherlands	wanted	to	become	a	gas-roundabout	for	northwest	Europe,	for	which	Russian																																																									
14	Communiqué	published	by	the	Dutch	MFA.	
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gas	 is	 an	 important	 source	 (Gas	 Unie	 2017;	 Dutch	 Ministry	 of	 Economic	 Affairs	 2014).	
Furthermore,	big	business	 interests	were	 involved.	Russian	oil	and	gas	were	 important	 for	
trade	 (re-export)	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 some	 Dutch	 energy	 companies	 (e.g.	 Shell	 and	
Gasunie)	 have	 considerable	 interests	 in	 the	 Russian	 energy	 market	 (Dutch	 Ministry	 of	
Economic	Affairs	2014).	
	
Conclusion	
Just	as	the	general	trend,	the	content	of	the	communiqués	on	energy	was	positive	in	2013	
and	 deteriorated	 in	 2014	 and	 2015.	 Since	 the	Ukraine	 crisis	 in	 2014	 it	 became	much	 less	
positive.	The	Dutch	MFA	together	with	the	other	EU	countries	wanted	to	decrease	the	EU’s	
energy	 dependence	 on	 Russia,	 to	 reduce	 this	 ‘vulnerability’.	 Examining	 the	 communiqués	
regarding	 energy	 has	 shown	a	 departmental	 difference	within	 the	Dutch	 government.	 For	
the	Dutch	MFA	political	interests	(of	long-term	stability	and	security)	were	more	important	
than	short	to	medium-term	economic	interests.	For	the	Dutch	Ministry	of	Economic	Affairs	
economic	interests	(growth	and	stable	gas	supply	in	the	future)	were	more	important.		
	
6.3	Sanctions	
Sanctions	are	an	interesting	topic	because	in	this	area	economic	interests	clash	with	political	
interests.	In	2014	the	EU	imposed	sanctions	on	Russia	in	reaction	to	its	role	in	Ukraine.	They	
exist	 of	 three	 tiers.	 The	 first	 tier	 of	 sanctions,	 implemented	 on	 6	 March	 2014,	 is	 the	
suspension	of	bilateral	talks	between	the	EU	and	Russia	on	a	visa	agreement	and	the	New	
Agreement	that	would	replace	the	1994	PCA	(European	Council	2017).	The	second	tier	are	
restrictive	 matters	 of	 travel	 bans	 and	 asset	 freezes	 of	 Russian	 and	 Crimean	 officials	
responsible	for	actions	threatening	the	territorial	integrity	of	Ukraine,	imposed	on	17	March	
2014	after	 the	 incorporation	of	Crimea.	 The	 list	of	 those	 involved	has	grown	over	 time	 to	
146	persons	and	37	entities	at	the	time	of	writing	(ibid.).	The	third	tier	of	sanctions	consists	
of	 restrictive	measures	 in	specific	Russian	sectors,	 imposed	on	31	July	2014.	These	 include	
restrictions	 on	 capital,	 weapons	 and	 oil	 extraction	 technologies	 (European	 Council	 2017).	
Additionally,	there	is	a	ban	on	importing	products	from	Crimea,	imposed	in	June	2014.	
Note	 the	 statements	 regarding	 sanctions	 are	 discussed,	 not	 the	 fact	 the	 sanctions	
are	implemented.	Discussing	sanctions	positively	means	wanting	them	eased	or	lifted;	when	
they	 are	 agreed	 with	 as	 they	 are,	 they	 are	 neutral;	 when	 they	 are	 considered	 not	 strict	
enough,	 it	 means	 the	 topic	 is	 discussed	 negatively.	 A	 communiqué	 is	 assessed	 as	 being	
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‘positive’	when	it	aids	in	building	constructive	Russian-Dutch	relations	and	‘negative’	when	it	
is	detrimental	to	such	relations.		
	
Figure	9:	Communiqués	regarding	sanctions	
Year	 Percentage	of	
communiqués	in	
which	discussed	
Average	value	
2013	 -	 -	
2014	 26%	 0	
2015	 11%	 -0.71	
	
The	sanctions	imposed	by	the	EU	on	Russia	are	a	topic	in	which	a	shift	in	attitude	is	
clear.	 Sanctions	 are	 the	 second	most	 discussed	 topic	 of	 2014,	 talked	 about	 in	 26%	 of	 the	
communiqués.	This	is	because	they	were	implemented	in	that	year,	while	in	2015	it	was	the	
question	whether	 they	 should	be	extended	or	not.	 Figure	9	 shows	 the	Dutch	government	
talked	about	Russia	and	the	sanctions	more	negatively	in	2015	than	2014.	The	average	value	
went	from	a	neutral	0	in	2014	to	negative	in	2015	with	a	score	of	-0.71.		
	
Wary	of	implementation	
Within	 2014	 a	 change	 occurred	 as	 well,	 with	 August	 as	 the	 turning	 point.	 The	 Dutch	
government	never	stated	its	disagreement	with	the	sanctions	policy	of	the	EU.	However,	 it	
made	remarks	that	indicate	a	difference	in	opinion.	Initially	it	was	wary	about	imposing	new	
sanctions	and	emphasized	dialogue	was	the	solution.	This	can	be	 interpreted	as	 the	Dutch	
government	resisting	the	use	of	sanctions	against	Russia.	
On	 14	 March	 the	 Dutch	 prime	 minister	 said	 the	 Netherlands	 did	 everything	 to	
prevent	 entering	 the	 second	 and	 third	 stage	 of	 the	 sanctions	 (Dutch	Ministry	 of	 General	
Affairs	2014b).	Meaning,	he	hoped	Russia	de-escalates	the	conflict	and	sanctions	were	not	
necessary.	However,	it	shows	the	Dutch	government	was	still	reluctant	to	impose	sanctions	
when	 troops	 had	 already	 entered	 Crimea.	 This	 poses	 the	 question	 as	 to	 whether	 trade	
interests	 played	 a	 role	 in	 this,	 because	 the	 Netherlands	 did	 not	 want	 its	 own	 business	
interests	to	be	hurt.		
The	Dutch	MFA	on	the	9th	of	July	(eight	days	before	the	MH17	crash)	still	stressed	no	
rash	decisions	should	be	made	to	expand	the	economic	sanctions	(Dutch	MFA	2014c).	Thus	
it	 still	 was	 against	 further	 sanctions.	 It	 believed	 the	 conflict	 could	 only	 be	 solved	 by	 a	
political	agreement	and	sanctions	would	not	contribute	to	this.	However,	in	August	2014	the	
Dutch	 government	 changed	 its	 stance	 and	 argued	 the	 sanctions	 imposed	 were	 not	 strict	
enough.	
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Not	strict	enough	sanctions	
On	 29	 August	 2014	 the	 Dutch	 prime	minister	 said	 possible	 extra	 sanctions	 should	 not	 be	
excluded	 (Dutch	Ministry	of	General	Affairs	 2014e).	 This	 is	 a	 big	 difference	 from	when	he	
said	the	EU	should	be	wary	to	impose	new	sanctions.	For	example,	the	Netherlands	already	
supported	 the	 weapons	 embargo	 against	 Russia,	 but	 since	 August	 2014	 believed	 the	
embargo	was	not	strict	enough	(Dutch	MFA	2014g).	While	the	Dutch	government	said	this	
shift	 had	 nothing	 to	 do	with	 the	 downing	 of	MH17,	 it	 changed	 its	 positions	 on	 sanctions	
shortly	 after	 this	 incident.	 Furthermore,	 the	Dutch	MFA	on	6	August	 said	 the	MH17	 crash	
speeded	the	EU’s	decision-making	process	of	the	sanctions	(Dutch	MFA	2014g).	Apparently,	
the	Netherlands	became	more	in	favour	of	sanctions	against	Russia	after	the	MH17	crash.	
In	2015	this	trend	continued	and	the	Dutch	government	did	not	exclude	additional	
sanctions.	 There	was	however,	 an	additional	point	 that	dialogue	had	 to	 remain	open.	The	
Dutch	government	believed	sanctions	had	to	continue	because	Russia	played	a	crucial	role	in	
the	 conflict	 in	 Ukraine,	 but	 dialogue	 had	 to	 stay	 open	 to	 ensure	 Russia	 implemented	 the	
Minsk	 Agreements	 (Dutch	 MFA	 2015o).	 Thus,	 the	 crash	 did	 not	 lead	 to	 a	 total	 break	 in	
relations.		
However,	the	statements	regarding	the	sanctions	became	more	negative	when	a	list	
of	 banned	 European	 politicians	 appeared.	 In	 reaction	 to	 the	 sanctions	 of	 the	 EU,	 Russia	
banned	 several	 European	 politicians	 from	 entering	 the	 country,	 including	 three	 Dutch	
parliamentarians.	The	Dutch	prime	minister	condemned	(“verwerpen”)	the	countersanctions	
and	emphasized	the	difference	in	reasoning.	He	argued	the	EU	imposed	sanctions	because	
of	the	‘illegal	annexation’	of	Crimea	and	continued	interference	of	Russia	in	eastern	Ukraine,	
while	 Russia	 imposed	 these	 sanctions	 without	 legal	 grounds	 (Dutch	 Ministry	 of	 General	
Affairs	2015c).	
The	Russian	government	argued	the	sanctions	imposed	by	the	EU	were	illegal,	since	
the	UNSC	did	not	approve	them	(Russian	MFA	2014b).	Moreover,	Russia	argued	its	counter	
measures	were	 legal,	because	they	were	a	defensive	reaction	on	the	EU’s	 illegal	sanctions.	
Russia	argued	its	ban	on	agricultural	products	from	the	EU	were	in	fact	not	sanctions,	but	a	
measure	to	protect	and	compensate	for	the	Russian	agricultural	producers	that	were	hit	by	
the	EU’s	sanctions	(Chizhov	2015a).	Assessing	the	legal	validity	of	these	arguments	is	not	in	
the	scope	of	this	thesis,	but	the	open	disagreement	over	the	sanctions	shows	relations	had	
deteriorated.	The	legal	validity	was	debated	in	politics	and	not	(solely)	in	court.		
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Conclusion	
The	Dutch	position	on	sanctions	shows	an	interesting	development,	because	it	differs	from	
the	general	trend	in	relations.	Initially,	the	Netherlands	wanted	to	ease	the	sanctions,	even	
when	 Crimea	 was	 annexed.	 Possibly	 Dutch	 business	 interests	 were	 more	 important	 than	
condemning	Russia’s	actions.	Once	the	primary	national	 interest	to	protect	 its	citizens	was	
violated,	 the	 Dutch	 government	 was	 willing	 to	 compromise	 on	 the	 secondary	 national	
interest	 of	 business	 interests.	 From	 that	 moment	 onwards,	 it	 became	more	 in	 favour	 of	
sanctions.	 Additionally,	 the	 more	 critical	 Russia	 became	 in	 2015	 of	 the	 objectivity	 of	 the	
investigation	 into	 the	 downing	 of	MH17,	 the	more	 the	 sanctions	were	 openly	 debated	 in	
politics.			
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7.	Ethical	concerns		
7.1	Human	rights	
Human	 rights	were	 the	most	 discussed	 topic	 in	 the	 government	 communiqués	 in	 2013.	 It	
was	 discussed	 in	 35%	 of	 the	 selected	 communiqués	 of	 2013.	 Both	 Russia	 and	 the	
Netherlands	have	specific	interests	regarding	human	rights.	For	the	Netherlands	these	were	
LGBT	rights	(lesbian,	gay,	bisexual,	transgender).	The	specific	LGBT	rights	were	raised	in	21%	
of	 the	 2013	 communications,	 always	 on	 Dutch	 initiative.	 Russia	 attached	 great	 value	 to	
compatriot	rights,	which	concerns	ethnic	Russians	and	Russian	speakers	abroad.	According	
to	Shevel	(2011,	195),	the	term	‘compatriot’	is	made	vague	deliberately	in	order	to	apply	it	
arbitrarily	when	it	suits	Russia’s	needs,	although	it	often	applies	to	orthodox	ethnic	Russians	
living	 in	 post-Soviet	 countries.	 It	 differs	 from	 protecting	 the	 Russian	 nationals	 abroad,	
mentioned	 in	 ‘diplomatic	 incidents’.	 Compatriots	 involve	 the	 rights	 of	 ethnic	 Russians	 or	
Russian	speakers	abroad	who	do	not	necessarily	have	Russian	nationality.		
	
Figure	10:	Communiqués	regarding	human	rights	
Year	 Percentage	of	
communiqués	in	which	
discussed	
Average	value	
2013	 35%	 0.12	
2014	 8%	 0.25	
2015	 11%	 -0.86	
	
The	 average	 score	of	 ‘human	 rights’	was	 0.12	 (LGBT	 -0.40)	 in	 2013.	 This	 is	mostly	
because	the	Netherlands	communicated	neutrally	regarding	human	rights	 in	general,	while	
it	made	negative	statements	regarding	the	LGBT	situation	in	Russia.	It	should	be	noted	this	
study	 is	not	an	analysis	of	 the	human	rights	situation	 in	both	countries.	 It	 is	an	analysis	of	
how	they	viewed	each	other’s	record	and	how	vocal	they	were	about	it.			
	
Active	–	responsive		
There	was	a	difference	in	how	active	the	governments	were	in	raising	human	rights.	Human	
rights	 were	 almost	 always	 raised	 on	 Dutch	 initiative.	 The	 Dutch	 parliament	 put	 much	
pressure	 on	 the	 Dutch	 government	 to	 discuss	 human	 rights	 with	 Russia.	 Therefore,	 the	
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communiqués	discussing	human	rights	were	mostly	of	the	Dutch	government,	in	reaction	to	
questions	by	the	Dutch	parliament.15	
The	specific	 issue	raised	most	frequently	by	the	Dutch	side	was	the	Russian	law	on	
prohibiting	 ‘propaganda	 of	 non-traditional	 relations’.	 The	Dutch	minister	 of	 foreign	 affairs	
asked	the	Russian	Duma	not	to	approve	this	“anti	gay-propaganda”	law	(Dutch	MFA	2013e).	
A	 minister	 asking	 a	 foreign	 parliament	 to	 not	 adopt	 a	 law	 is	 quite	 drastic.	 However,	 the	
minister	added	Russia	had	 to	 respect	 its	 international	obligations	 (ibid.).	He	did	not	attack	
the	law	directly,	which	made	these	communiqués	less	critical.	
The	Russian	government	usually	discussed	human	rights	as	a	response	to	an	incident	
or	in	reaction	to	when	the	Netherlands	raised	it.	For	example,	when	the	Russian	minister	of	
foreign	 affairs	 was	 asked	 about	 the	 rights	 of	 LGBT	 community	 in	 Russia,	 he	 raised	 the	
situation	of	Russian	compatriots	 (in	 this	 case	Russian	 speaking)	 in	 the	Baltics	whose	 rights	
were	infringed	(Russian	MFA	2013i).	The	Russian	minister	of	foreign	affairs	in	2013	raised	its	
concerns	on	human	 rights	 in	 the	Netherlands,	 in	which	 it	 emphasized	 “nobody	 is	perfect”	
(Russian	MFA	2013f).	The	Russian	MFA	said	there	was	an	organization	for	paedophiles	in	the	
Netherlands	and	he	raised	a	Dutch	oppositional	party’s	restrictive	position	on	women	(ibid.).	
The	Russian	MFA	said	it	would	respect	the	Netherlands	if	its	society	wanted	to	live	this	way	
(ibid.).	Thereby	he	suggested	he	wanted	the	Netherlands	also	to	accept	Russia’s	choices	of	
its	 society.	 It	 shows	Russia	was	willing	 to	 listen	 to	Dutch	 concerns,	 but	was	 not	willing	 to	
change	anything.		
	
Importance	of	international	organizations	
Both	 countries	 talked	 about	 human	 rights	 concerns,	 but	 they	 did	 not	 condemn	 it.	 They	
mainly	 ‘exchanged	 views’.	 For	 example,	 when	 the	 Dutch	minister	 of	 foreign	 affairs	 asked	
about	the	human	rights	situation,	the	Russian	minister	of	foreign	affairs	emphasized	the	two	
discussed	 human	 rights	 and	 agreed	 countries	 cannot	 lecture	 each	 other	 (Russian	 MFA	
2013i).	 Furthermore,	 both	 agreed	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 shared	 approach	 under	
international	obligations	(ibid.).		
In	 2013	 the	Dutch	 government	 said	 it	 did	 not	want	 to	 force	 its	 values	 on	 Russian	
society	and	it	acknowledged	the	differences	(Dutch	MFA	2013d,	2).	The	goal	of	dialogue	on	
human	rights	was	to	remind	each	other	of	the	international	obligations	Russia	had	entered	
in	to	(ibid.). An	example	 is	when,	 in	response	to	a	critical	report	of	Amnesty	 International,																																																									
15	The	study	uses	answers	 to	parliamentary	questions,	because	 it	 shows	the	government’s	 (MFA’s)	position	on	
certain	topics	that	are	often	controversial,	thus	it	is	says	more	on	the	relations.	Only	the	government’s	positions	
are	used	and	not	the	introduction	or	questions	themself.		
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the	Dutch	MFA	did	not	judge	the	human	rights	situation	in	Russia	itself.	It	acknowledged	the	
concerns	of	the	report,	but	focused	its	statements	on	the	international	obligations	of	Russia	
(Dutch	MFA	2013a).	 In	one	communiqué,	 in	April	2013,	 the	Netherlands	 said	homophobia	
and	lack	of	acceptation	of	homosexuality	was	not	new	in	Russia.	The	Netherlands	argued,	it	
therefore	was	not	 surprising	 that	 the	ban	on	 ‘promoting	non-traditional	 relations’	or	 “anti	
gay-propaganda	law”	had	common	support	(Dutch	MFA	2013b).	This	shows	the	Dutch	MFA	
tried	to	create	understanding	for	Russia’s	decisions	and	different	view.	It	was	a	rhetorically	
positive	 statement.	 However,	 the	 Netherlands	 was	 still	 critical	 of	 the	 LGBT	 situation	 and	
raised	it	in	meetings	with	Russia,	as	when	the	Russian	president	visited	the	Netherlands	on	8	
April	2013	(Kremlin	2013a).		
In	 2014	 the	 statements	 continued	 that	 the	 two	 countries	 could	 not	 lecture	 each	
other	on	how	to	act.	However,	in	2014	human	rights	were	no	longer	discussed	the	most.	It	
was	 only	 mentioned	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 2014.	 The	 prime	 minister	 believed	 by	 engaging	
relations	in	different	areas	the	human	rights	situation	could	be	improved	(Dutch	Ministry	of	
General	Affairs	2014a).	He	did	not	give	his	opinion	on	the	human	rights	situation	itself.		
	
Deteriorating	relations	between	Russia	and	international	institutions	
In	2015	the	communications	on	human	rights	were	more	negative	than	the	year	before.	The	
average	score	of	2015	was	-0.86,	as	can	be	seen	in	figure	10.	In	2015	the	Dutch	government	
stated	 that	 promoting	 human	 rights	 in	 Russia	 was	 still	 of	 crucial	 importance	 (Dutch	MFA	
2015c,	 7).	 It	 emphasized	 the	 international	 agreements	 Russia	 had	 committed	 itself	 to.	
Possibly	the	Netherlands	did	so,	because	this	way	it	took	less	responsibility	for	statements,	
and	 carried	 less	 risk	 of	 retaliation.	 An	 alternative	 explanation	 could	 be	 it	 believed	 that	
reminding	Russia	of	its	agreed	obligations	was	the	most	effective	way	to	improve	the	human	
rights	situation.		
However,	relations	between	Russia	and	the	international	organizations	Russia	is	part	
of	were	under	strain,	which	made	it	more	difficult	to	promote	human	rights	through	these	
international	 organizations.	 The	 relations	 between	 the	Council	 of	 Europe	 and	Russia	were	
under	pressure.	After	the	incorporation	of	Crimea,	the	Council	of	Europe	suspended	Russia’s	
voting	 right	 in	 the	 Council.	 In	 reaction	 to	 this	 Russia	 withdrew	 from	 the	 Council’s	
Parliamentary	 Assembly.	 On	 14	 July	 2015	 the	 Russian	 Constitutional	 Court	 decided	 the	
Russian	 constitution	 takes	 precedence	 over	 the	 rulings	 of	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	
Rights.	The	Dutch	government	believed	human	rights	were	under	pressure	because	of	 this	
decision	(Dutch	MFA	2015b).		
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Conclusion	
The	Netherlands	and	Russia	had	differing	views	on	human	rights.	Especially	the	Netherlands	
was	actively	raising	its	human	rights	concerns,	while	Russia	raised	its	human	rights	concerns	
in	 response	 to	 when	 the	 Netherlands	 did	 so,	 or	 when	 an	 incident	 had	 occurred	 with	 a	
Russian	 compatriot.	 It	 reaffirms	 Russia’s	 priority	 to	 protect	 its	 compatriots,	 in	 addition	 to	
protecting	Russian	citizens	abroad.		
Despite	 the	 topic	 being	 discussed	 so	 often,	 it	was	 an	 exchange	of	 views	 and	both	
countries	 did	 not	 believe	 the	 other	 had	 to	 change.	 A	 possible	 explanation	 of	 the	 Dutch	
insistence	 on	 the	 international	 obligations	 of	 Russia,	 is	 that	 it	 was	 a	 tactic	 to	 raise	 the	
concerns	without	offending	Russia.	 Russia	 could	hardly	 be	 angry	with	 the	Netherlands	 for	
reminding	Russia	of	its	own	promises.		
In	2013	both	countries	wanted	to	maintain	the	existing	good	relations,	despite	their	
human	 rights	 differences.	 However,	 in	 2015	 the	 relations	 between	 Russia	 and	 the	
international	institutions	that	ensure	human	rights	got	worse.	Similarly	so,	did	the	Russian-
Dutch	 relations	 deteriorate.	 Because	 Russian-Dutch	 relations	 in	 general	 had	 deteriorated	
and	the	international	institutions	through	which	the	Netherlands	sought	to	influence	human	
rights	 in	Russia	had	become	 less	effective	there,	both	had	reasons	to	make	more	negative	
statements	on	each	other	regarding	human	rights.	Unlike	the	general	trend	in	relations,	the	
communiqués	 concerning	 human	 rights	 did	 not	 deteriorate	 in	 2014	 at	 the	 moments	 of	
Crimea’s	incorporation	or	the	downing	of	MH17.	However,	human	rights	did	get	raised	less	
since	then.		
	
		 	
	 47	
8.	Conclusion			
The	main	question	of	 this	 thesis	 is:	how	did	the	different	 issues	of	Russian-Dutch	relations	
develop	 in	 the	 communiqués	published	by	both	governments	over	 the	period	2013-2015?	
The	 four	 sub-questions	 to	 answer	 this	 are:	 what	 are	 the	 most	 discussed	 key	 issues	 of	
Russian-Dutch	relations?	How	can	these	issues	be	analysed?	What	was	the	general	trend	in	
Russian-Dutch	relations?	How	do	the	most	discussed	topics	relate	to	the	general	trend	in	the	
relations?		
This	 study	 examined	 all	 the	 communiqués	 from	 the	 Russian	 and	 Dutch	MFA	 and	
their	 head	 of	 state,	 or	 government,	 published	 over	 the	 period	 2013-2015,	 in	 order	 to	
examine	what	the	key	issues	were	for	both	governments.	The	issues	discussed	in	more	than	
15%	of	one	year’s	communiqués	are	deemed	‘key	issues’	in	this	study.	These	are	the	topics	
discussed	above.	
A	value	was	given	to	each	communiqué	and	each	topic,	from	‘-2’	(very	negative)	to	
‘+2’	(very	positive),	in	order	to	analyse	how	the	issues	developed	over	time.	It	is	assessed	as	
being	‘positive’	when	it	aids	in	building	a	constructive	partnership	and	‘negative’	when	it	is	
detrimental	 for	 such	 a	 partnership.	 From	 reading	 all	 the	 different	 communiqués,	
connections	 can	 be	 drawn	 between	 the	 developments	 of	 the	 different	 topics	 and	 the	
general	 trend	 in	 Russian-Dutch	 relations.	 This	 method	 for	 selection	 and	 analysis	 resulted	
into	four	main	findings,	which	answer	the	last	two	sub-questions.		
The	first	finding	is	that,	overall	the	two	countries	talked	about	each	other	in	a	more	
negative	 way	 in	 the	 communiqués	 and	 this	 thus	 confirms	 the	 relations	 in	 general	 had	
deteriorated.	This	 is	 confirmed	by	 the	general	 trend,	which	shows	 that	 the	content	of	 the	
communiqués	became	more	negative	after	the	 incorporation	of	Crimea	in	March	2014,	and	
again	shortly	after	the	downing	of	MH17	 in	July	2014.	 In	2013	the	average	value	of	all	 the	
communiqués	was	0.13,	in	2014	-0.25	and	in	2015	it	was	-0.66.	
The	second	main	finding	of	the	research	 is	that	the	issues	developed	distinctly	from	
each	other,	and	changed	at	different	points	in	time.	In	other	words,	they	did	not	all	exactly	
follow	the	general	trend.	The	topics	that	were	addressed	more	negatively	from	the	moment	
of	 Crimea’s	 incorporation	 were:	 the	 Ukraine	 crisis,	 energy,	 and	 after	 three	 months,	 also	
Crimea’s	 incorporation	 itself.	 After	 the	 downing	 of	 MH17	 the	 topics	 ‘the	 shared	
neighbourhood’	 and	 ‘sanctions’	 were	 discussed	more	 negatively.	 The	 discussion	 on	 other	
subjects	became	negative	in	the	beginning	of	2015.	These	were	‘MH17’,	‘human	rights’	and	
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‘diplomatic	 incidents’.	 The	 discussion	 on	 trade,	 however,	 is	 one	 topic	 that	 did	 not	
deteriorate.		
It	 is	 remarkable	 however,	 that	 communiqués	 regarding	 ‘MH17’	 and	 ‘Crimea’s	
incorporation’	 did	 not	 begin	 to	 deteriorate	 until	 a	 later	 stage,	 considering	 they	 were	 the	
main	events	 that	 caused	antagonism	between	 the	 two	countries.	 The	Netherlands	 initially	
discussed	Russia	and	MH17	positively,	probably	because	it	wanted	to	ensure	cooperation	to	
repatriate	 the	 bodies.	 Regarding	 the	Netherlands	 and	MH17,	 Russia’s	 initial	 response	was	
positive.	 However,	 this	 could	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 Russia	 wanted	 to	 ensure	 an	
independent	investigation.	Russia	became	more	critical	of	the	Netherlands,	regarding	MH17,	
when	it	felt	it	was	unjustly	held	to	be	complicit	in	the	downing.	The	Netherlands	did	not	call	
Crimea’s	incorporation	‘an	illegal	annexation’	until	many	other	countries	had	said	so,	and	it	
believed	Russia	did	not	de-escalate	the	conflict	 in	eastern	Ukraine.	Why	the	content	of	the	
communiqués	changed	is	explained	by	the	third	key	finding.		
The	 third	 main	 finding	 is	 that	 security	 became	 a	 more	 important	 issue	 than	
economic	 interests.	The	 literature	until	2011	argued	trade	was	the	most	 important	 for	the	
Netherlands;	at	this	time	security	was	not	an	issue.	The	Netherlands	started	to	see	Russia	as	
a	threat	to	the	stability	of	the	EU	and	its	neighbours,	and	because	of	this,	security	began	to	
play	 a	 more	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 Russian-Dutch	 relations.	 It	 could	 be	 said	 that,	 the	
Netherlands	 in	 2013	 held	 a	 Russia-first	 policy	 in	 the	 shared	 neighbourhood,	 where	 good	
relations	with	countries	of	the	shared	neighbourhood	were	possible	as	long	as	they	were	not	
at	the	expense	of	good	relations	with	Russia.	Since	the	beginning	of	2015	this	was	no	longer	
the	case,	and	the	EU	and	the	Netherlands	chose	a	‘shared	neighbourhood-first’	policy.	This	
was	 probably	 done	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 those	 who	 really	 came	 first	 –	 the	 EU	 countries	
themselves.	For	an	EU	(and	the	Netherlands)-first	policy	they	see	a	stable	neighbourhood	as	
essential,	because	it	limits	migration,	secures	border	integrity	and	fosters	economic	growth.	
Russia	was	seen	as	a	destabilizer	in	this	region,	and	therefore	was	now	counterbalanced	by	
Dutch	(and	EU)	condemnation,	sanctions	and	increased	military	spending.		
For	 the	 Netherlands	 the	 effects	 of	 an	 unstable	 shared	 neighbourhood	 became	
painfully	real	when	MH17	was	downed	and	196	Dutch	nationals	deceased.	This	was	a	breach	
of	the	primary	responsibility	of	the	Dutch	government	–	ensuring	the	safety	of	its	citizens.	It	
caused	 the	 Netherlands	 to	 re-evaluate	 its	 priorities	 and	 return	 the	 focus	 to	 its	 primary	
national	 interests.	 Together	 with	 this,	 repatriation	 of	 bodies	 and	 technical	 and	 criminal	
investigation	of	the	crash	became	important.	When	Russia	was	critical	of	the	objectivity	and	
quality	 of	 the	 investigation,	 the	 bilateral	 relations	 deteriorated	 further.	 It	 was	 a	 strike	
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against	one	of	the	Dutch	new	top	interests,	to	prosecute	those	responsible	for	the	downing	
of	MH17.	When	the	priority	to	ensure	the	safety	of	its	citizens	is	in	conflict	with	the	priority	
of	economic	interests,	the	former	takes	precedence,	as	can	be	seen	in	the	Dutch	position	on	
sanctions.	
Trade	 is	 a	 mutually	 beneficial	 area,	 but	 since	 the	 downing	 of	 MH17	 the	 Dutch	
government	 became	 more	 in	 favour	 of	 sanctions	 towards	 Russia.	 The	 sanctions	 were	 a	
political	tool	in	order	to	pressure	Russia	to	deescalate	the	conflict	in	eastern	Ukraine	and	to	
deter	Russia	from	further	destabilizing	the	shared	neighbourhood.	The	Dutch	sanctions	and	
Russia’s	counter	sanctions	hurt	both	their	economies,	which	shows	political	 interests	were	
more	significant	than	economic	interests.	However,	economic	interests	were	not	completely	
neglected,	as	the	discussion	on	trade	in	general	remained	positive.	
The	 fourth	 and	 final	 key	 finding	 is	 that	 ethical	 issues	were	mainly	discussed	when	
relations	 were	 friendly.	 The	 literature	 that	 analysed	 the	 relations	 until	 2011,	 said	 the	
Netherlands	 raised	 ethical	 issues	 regardless	 of	 strong	 trade	 relations.	 The	 research	 has	
shown	 ethical	 concerns	 were	 raised	 at	 the	 same	 time	 trade	 was	 flourishing,	 and	 raising	
ethical	concerns	was	no	impediment	to	trade.	However,	only	when	relations	were	friendly,	
were	 ethical	 concerns	 raised.	 Furthermore,	 this	 was	 a	mere	 exchange	 of	 views	 and	 both	
countries	 did	 not	 take	 the	 other’s	 concerns	 to	 heart.	 When	 the	 relations	 were	 tense,	
communiqués	 focused	on	 the	difficult	parts	 that	 strained	 the	 relations,	and	not	on	ethical	
concerns.		
Thus	 in	 answer	 to	 the	 main	 question,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 the	 different	 issues	 of	
Russian-Dutch	relations	fluctuated,	but	the	general	trend,	as	revealed	by	the	communiqués,	
shows	a	significant	falling	off	after	Crimea’s	incorporation	and	the	downing	of	MH17.	Due	to	
these	two	events,	security	became	more	important	in	Russian-Dutch	relations	and	the	focus	
returned	to	the	primary	national	interest	to	protect	the	state	and	its	citizens.		
Putting	these	findings	in	Leonard	and	Popescu’s	categories,	as	were	discussed	in	the	
literature	 review,	 the	Netherlands	 falls	 somewhere	between	 the	category	of	a	very	 ‘frosty	
pragmatic’	or	even	a	 ‘new	cold	warrior’	 in	 the	period	2013-2015.	The	 two	were	 critical	of	
each	 other,	 national	 leaders	 have	 ceased	 contact,	 diplomatic	 disputes	were	 common	 and	
were	 followed	 with	 political	 and	 economic	 reactions	 –	 however,	 there	 was	 still	 dialogue	
between	the	two	countries.	
	Russia’s	 position	 towards	 the	 Netherlands	 reflects	 its	 desire	 to	 become	 a	 great	
power	 in	 a	 multi-polar	 world,	 wherefore	 it	 challenged	 the	 status	 quo.	 In	 this	 multi-polar	
world,	the	Netherlands	was	not	one	of	the	great	poles	and	therefore	often	not	
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discussions	on	international	topics.	However,	the	research	did	not	find	any	signs	of	a	‘divide	
and	rule’	tactic	towards	the	Netherlands.	MH17	was	the	most	important	issue	for	Russia	in	
which	 it	 mentioned	 the	 Netherlands.	 It	 increasingly	 felt	 it	 was	 being	 unjustly	 held	
responsible	for	the	crash.	The	bilateral	 incidents	were	the	second	most	discussed	topics	of	
Russia.	Thus,	the	times	the	Netherlands	mattered	to	Russia	were	reactions	to	incidents	and	
few	of	its	communiqués	were	on	the	structural	features	of	the	Russian-Dutch	relations.	
	 More	 could	 have	 been	 said	 about	 Russia’s	 position	 towards	 the	 Netherlands	 if	
Russian-language	 sources	 were	 included,	 which	 is	 interesting	 for	 future	 research.	
Additionally,	 future	 research	could	examine	other	sources,	 such	as	other	ministries,	media	
or	 include	 public	 opinion.	 The	 most	 important	 contribution	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 the	 detailed	
documentation	of	developments	in	Russian-Dutch	relations	and	the	less	subjective	method	
to	 assess	 this,	where	other	 academic	 articles	 and	 expert	 views	were	based	on	 experience	
and	more	 arbitrary	 assessment	 of	 the	 developments.	 The	 numerical	 operationalization	 to	
assess	 developments	 in	 the	 communiqués	 helps	 to	 study	 relations	 less	 arbitrarily.	
Additionally,	this	study	contributes	to	academic	research	on	Russian-Dutch	relations,	which	
was	underdeveloped.	
	 	The	Russian-Dutch	 relations	deteriorated	over	 the	period	2013-2015	and	were	no	
longer	 ‘mutually	 beneficial’,	 as	 was	 stated	 in	 the	 2013	 Russian	 Foreign	 Policy	 Concept.	
Neither	has	it	been	‘business	as	usual’,	since	they	have	become	more	critical	of	each	other	in	
the	 communiqués.	 There	 were	 no	 signs	 the	 countries	 wanted	 to	 move	 past	 the	 difficult	
relations	 in	 the	 end	 of	 2015,	 and	 one	 could	 say	 this	 unusual	 business	 of	 negative	
communiqués	has	become	the	new	‘business	as	usual’.		
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Appendices	
Appendix	A:	Annual	scores	all	topics	
	
2013	
Topic	 Percentage	of	communiqués	 Average	value	
Human	rights	 35%	 0,12	
Russia-Netherlands	Year16	 25%	 1,17	
Trade	 23%	 1,00	
Incident;	Arctic	Sunrise	 23%	 -0,27	
LGBT	 21%	 -0,40	
Incident;	Russian	diplomat	arrest	 17%	 0,00	
Energy	 6%	 1,33	
Importance	international	
organizations	 6%	 1,00	
Incident;	Dutch	diplomat	assault	 6%	 0,33	
Culture	 6%	 1,33	
Incident;	Dolmatov	 6%	 0,33	
NGO	foreign	agent	legislation	 4%	 -0,50	
Shared	neighbourhood	 4%	 -0,50	
EU-Russia	 4%	 -0,50	
Common	history	 4%	 1,50	
Magnitsky		 2%	 -1,00	
Environment	 2%	 1,00	
Ukraine	crisis	 2%	 0,00	
Migration	 2%	 0,00	
Asylum	 2%	 0,00	
Incident;	burglary	 2%	 0,00	
Investments	 2%	 2,00	
Syria	 2%	 -1,00			
2014	
																																																								
16	The	topic	‘Russia-Netherlands	Year’	is	used	as	a	context	with	little	content.	It	discusses	the	relations	in	general.	
Hence	it	is	not	used	as	a	chapter	in	this	thesis.	
Topic	 Percentage	of	
communiqués	 Average	value	
Ukraine	crisis	 34%	 -0,50	
Sanctions	 26%	 0,00	
MH17	 23%	 0,25	
Crimea	 21%	 -1,00	
Shared	neighbourhood	 21%	 -0,73	
Energy	 11%	 0,17	
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2015	
Topic	 Percentage	of	
communiqués	 Average	value	
MH17	 31%	 -0,63	
Shared	neighbourhood	 23%	 -0,93	
Ukraine	crisis	 16%	 -0,50	
Syria	 13%	 0,00	
Sanctions	 11%	 -0,71	
Human	rights	 11%	 -0,86	
Crimea	 8%	 -1,00	
Energy	 7%	 0,00	
Trade	 5%	 0,67	
Russian	counter	sanctions	 3%	 -1,50	
Incident;	Arctic	Sunrise	 3%	 -1,00	
Incident;	Crimean	gold	 2%	 0,00	
Extradition	Drinkman	 2%	 -1,00	
Incident;	Dutch	diplomat	assault	 2%	 -1,00	
Migration	 2%	 0,00	
Asylum	 2%	 0,00	
LGBT	 2%	 -1,00	
Russia-Netherlands	Year	 2%	 -1,00	
Fight	against	international	
terrorism	 2%	 0,00				
	
LGBT	 9%	 0,60	
Olympics	 8%	 0,75	
Human	rights	 8%	 0,25	
EU-Russia	 8%	 0,00	
Importance	international	
organisations	 4%	 0,00	
Trade	 4%	 1,00	
Russia-Netherlands	Year	 4%	 1,50	
Opening	new	consulate	in	the	
Netherlands	 2%	 1,00	
Extradition	Drinkman	 2%	 -1,00	
Incident;	Crimean	gold	 2%	 -1,00	
Incident;	airspace	violation	 2%	 0,00	
Asylum	 2%	 0,00	
Migration	 2%	 0,00	
Culture	 2%	 2,00	
